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Abstract
Cayley Graphs of Semigroups and Applications to Hashing
by
Bianca Sosnovski
Adviser: Vladimir Shpilrain
In 1994, Tillich and Ze´mor proposed a scheme for a family of hash functions that uses
products of matrices in groups of the form SL2(F2n). In 2009, Grassl et al. developed an
attack to obtain collisions for palindromic bit strings by exploring a connection between the
Tillich-Ze´mor functions and maximal length chains in the Euclidean algorithm for polyno-
mials over F2.
In this work, we present a new proposal for hash functions based on Cayley graphs
of semigroups. In our proposed hash function, the noncommutative semigroup of linear
functions under composition is considered as platform for the scheme. We will also discuss
its efficiency, pseudorandomness and security features.
Furthermore, we generalized the Fit-Florea and Matula’s algorithm (2004) that finds
the discrete logarithm in the multiplicative group of integers modulo 2k by establishing a
connection between semi-primitive roots modulo 2k where k ≥ 3 and the logarithmic base
used in the algorithm.
vDedicated to the memory of
Raymundo Amoras, Sebastiana Amoras,
Arnold Presayzen and Sophia Lubensky.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Hash functions are an important tool for cryptography. They are fundamental blocks in the
construction of several cryptographic primitives such as digital signatures and key derivation
systems.
Hash functions are easy-to-compute compression functions that take a variable-length
input and convert it to a fixed-length output. Hash functions are used as compact represen-
tations, or digital fingerprints, of data and to provide message integrity. The following are
some basic requirements for cryptographic hash functions:
• Preimage resistance: it should be computationally infeasible to find an input which
hashes to a specified output;
• Second-preimage resistance: it should be computationally infeasible to find a second
input that hashes to the same output as a specified input;
• Collision resistance: it should be computationally infeasible to find two different inputs
that hash to the same output.
Most hash functions in use today have constructions that apply some sort of iterative
1
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design involving a compression function and a transformation as the Merkle-Damg˚ard [19].
But the vulnerability of such hash functions to attacks in recent years suggest investigating
new designs. In contrast to the traditional model of hash functions, provably secure hash
functions are hash functions whose security are based on the difficulty of solving a known
“hard” problem.
Examples of provably secure hash functions are the Cayley hash functions that are based
on the Cayley graphs of certain (semi)groups. The Cayley graphs of the underlying groups
of the past proposals are expander graphs, thus presenting interesting properties such that
of the rapid mixing of Markov chains [7]. These Cayley hash functions are designed so that
their security would follow from the alleged hardness of a mathematical problem related to
the expander graph of the (semi)group associated with it.
In 1991, Ze´mor introduced a family of hash functions whose values correspond to matrix
products in groups of the form SL2(Fp) for p prime [38]. This first instance of a Cayley hash
function was broken in 1994 by Tillich and Ze´mor. As replacement to increase the security
of the scheme, they also provided the group SL2(F2n) where F2n is a field with 2n elements
[35, 34]. The work of Tillich and Ze´mor received significant interest and other proposals
for Cayley hash functions were suggested based on the Ramanujan graphs constructed by
Pizer and Lubotzky-Phillips-Sarnak (LPS) [7], and the Ramanujan graphs constructed by
Morgenstern [28].
Unlike the SHA family of hash functions that hash blocks of input, the Tillich-Ze´mor
function hashes each bit individually. More specifically, the “0” bit is hashed to a particular
2× 2 matrix A, and the “1” bit is hashed to another 2× 2 matrix B. Then any bit string is
hashed simply to the product of matrices A and B corresponding to bits in this string. For
example, the bit string 10010 is hashed to the matrix BA2BA.
The matrices used in the Tillich-Ze´mor scheme are elements from the group SL2(F2n)
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with F2n ≈ F2[x]/(p(x)) where F2 is the field with two elements, F2[x] is the ring of polyno-
mials over F2, and (p(x)) is the ideal generated by an irreducible polynomial p(x) in F2[x]
of degree n. These matrices are A =

α 1
1 0
 and B =

α α + 1
1 1
, where α is a root
of p(x).
The Tillich-Ze´mor hash function sustained attacks until 2009 when Grassl et al. [11]
established a connection between the Tillich-Ze´mor function and maximal length chains in
the Euclidean algorithm for polynomials over the field with two elements. The connection
makes possible to obtain collisions between distinct palindromic bit strings. Following this
attack, Petit and Quisquater [29] offered a modification of the Grassl et al.’s algorithm to
provide a second-preimage algorithm and also provided an extended form of the Grassl et
al.’s algorithm to find preimages.
Such attacks can only be applied to the specific group generated by the matrices A and
B above. A general attack for the Tillich-Ze´mor scheme with group SL2(Fq) is proposed in
[21]. The attack runs with super-polynomial time O(√q) to find collisions for arbitrary q.
This attack is infeasible for bit strings of length n > 100.
Petit and Quisquater [29, 30] suggested that security might be recovered by introducing
new generators. The Cayley hash function design is still appealing and it deserves further
interest in cryptography by showing that the factorization, representation and balance prob-
lem in noncommutative groups still are potentially hard problems for general parameters of
Cayley hash functions. As an example, Bromberg, Shpilrain and Vdovina in a recent paper
[4] suggested other pairs of matrices of the form

1 k
0 1
 and

1 0
k 1
, k ≥ 2, with the
idea that these matrices generate a free monoid over Z and that there cannot be any short
Chapter 1. Introduction 4
relations between them over Fp.
In this work, we offer a new semigroup platform for hashing, corresponding to a pair of
two linear functions in one variable over Fp under composition operation. The hash functions
are f(x) = 2x + 1 and g(x) = 3x + 1 modulo a prime p > 3. The result is a very efficient
hash function, which hashes a bit string of length n with time complexity of at most 2n
multiplications and 2n additions in Fp.
The input string for the new hash function can have an arbitrary length, while the output
is of size 2 log p. This is an advantage compared to the Tillich-Ze´mor proposal whose outputs
have length 4 log p. With respect to the security of our hash function, we give explicit lower
bound on the length of collisions and also discuss the possibility of known attacks be applied
to our hash function.
Furthermore, we also present a generalization of the discrete logarithm algorithm intro-
duced by Fit-Florea and Matula in [9]. They present an additive bit-serial algorithm where
the integer 3 is used as logarithmic base modulo 2k for k ≥ 3.
Hardware support for applications where fast residue arithmetic is needed generally relies
on residue addition and multiplication. Finding efficient algorithms to perform other residue
operations was desirable. New applications in cryptography can benefit from higher precision
hardware implementation of integer arithmetic. Fit-Florea-Matula algorithm represents an
efficient way of implementing hardware to perform fast residue arithmetic for the discrete
logarithm and multiplicative inverse with any precision of k bits.
We extend Fit-Florea and Matula’s results to any semi-primitive roots modulo 2k. An
integer h is a semi-primitive root modulo n if its order is φ(n)/2 = 2n−2. The connection
between semi-primitive roots modulo 2k and the logarithmic base is possible because the
order of such elements.
In relation to the discrete logarithm modulo 2k, we also discuss the problem of finding
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the minimum value for n+m such that 5n · 3m ≡ 1 mod 2127. It turned out that finding the
minimum value is not an easy task. But applying the results generalizing the Fit-Florea and
Matula’s algorithm, we are at least able to find an upper bound to n+m.
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Hash Functions
Cryptographic hash functions are fundamental building blocks of many computer security
schemes and protocols. They are used to ensure data integrity, authentication, certification
and confidentiality.
Similar to conventional hash functions commonly used in non-cryptographic computer
applications, cryptographic hash functions map larger domains to smaller ranges (many-to-
one mappings) but the latter differ in several important aspects from the former. We restrict
our focus to cryptographic hash functions and from now on we refer to them simply as hash
functions.
A hash function takes a message as input and returns an output referred to as hash
code, hash value or simply hash. The hash value of such a function serves as a compact
representative image (also known as digital fingerprint or message digest) of an input string,
which can be used as if it were uniquely identifiable with that string. Because the existence
of collisions (pairs of inputs with same hash value) in many-to-one functions is guaranteed,
the unique identification between inputs and their hash values is in the computational sense.
In practice, a hash value should be uniquely identifiable with a single input and collisions
6
Chapter 2. Cryptographic Hash Functions 7
should be computationally difficult to find, that is, “never” occurring in practice.
2.1 Definition
Hash functions can be classified as keyed and unkeyed hash functions. The specification of
keyed hash functions dictates two distinct inputs, a message and a secret key, while unkeyed
hash functions have only a single input, the message.
Definition 2.1. A (Unkeyed) hash function is a function h which satisfies, as a minimum,
the following two conditions:
1. Compression: h maps an input x of arbitrary finite bit length to an output h(x) of
fixed bit length n.
h : {0, 1}∗ −→ {0, 1}n
2. Easy of computation: given h and an input x, h(x) is easy to compute1.
2.2 Security properties
Since hash functions are uniquely identifiable with input strings, one of their applications
is to serve as manipulation detection codes (MDCs) whose hash values are such that an
accidental or intentional change of the input string will change the hash value. For that
purpose (together with other mechanisms), it is desirable that hash function also satisfies at
least one of the properties below. Let h be a hash function:
1“Computationally feasible” (or “easy”) means polynomial time and space or, in practice, with a certain
number of machine operations to time units [19].
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1. Preimage resistance: Given a hash value y for which a corresponding input is not
known, it is computationally infeasible 2 to find any input x such that y = h(x). This
property is also known as one-wayness.
2. Second-preimage resistance: Given an input x1 it is computationally infeasible to find
another input x2 where x1 6= x2 such that h(x1) = h(x2). This property is also referred
to as weak collision resistance.
3. Collision resistance: It is computationally infeasible to find any two inputs x1 and x2
where x1 6= x2 such that h(x1) = h(x2). This property is sometimes referred to as
strong collision resistance.
Definition 2.2. A one-way hash function (OWHF) is a hash function that satisfies the
properties of preimage resistance and second-preimage resistance.
Definition 2.3. A collision resistant hash function (CRHF) is a hash function that satisfies
the properties of second-preimage resistance and collision resistance.
Example 2.1. Consider a simple modulo-32 checksum (different modulus may be used).
This function takes an binary string and divides it into 32-bit blocks and computing the
modular sum of those blocks. This function is easily computed and offers compression.
But we can easily construct a binary string that shares the same checksum. That is, it
is possible to work backwards from the checksum to an input satisfying the sum. Hence,
this checksum function is not preimage resistant. It is neither second-preimage resistant nor
collision resistant.
2According to Petit and Quisquater [30], “computationally infeasible” (or “hard”) can be understood in
two ways:
- Practically, it means that no big cluster of computers can perform the task.
- Theoretically, it means that no probabilistic algorithm running in time polynomial in n succeeds in perform-
ing the task for large values of the parameter n with probability larger than the inverse of some polynomial
function of n.
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Example 2.2. Let g(x) = x2 mod n be a function for appropriate randomly chosen primes
p and q where n = pq and the factorization of n is unknown. g is preimage resistant because
finding a preimage corresponds to computing a square root, which is equivalent to factoring
n and thus allegedly computationally hard [19, § 9.2.4]. However, x and −x yield the same
output making trivial to find a second-preimage and a collision. Therefore, g is neither an
OWHF nor a CRHF.
2.3 Relations between properties
Here we present some relationships between the hash function properties above.
Fact 2.1. Preimage resistance does not guarantee second-preimage resistance3
Justification: See example 2.2 above.
Fact 2.2. A collision resistance hash function is also second-preimage resistant.
Justification: Assume that h is a collision resistant hash function. Fix an input x1. If h
is not second-preimage resistant then it is computationally feasible to find a distinct input
x2 such that h(x1) = h(x2). Thus, the pair (x1, x2) forms a collision for h, contradicting the
collision resistance property of h.
Fact 2.3. Second-preimage resistance does not guarantee preimage resistance.
Justification: Let g be a collision resistant hash function that maps arbitrary-length
inputs to n-bit outputs. Then define a hash function by4
h(x) =

1 || x, if x has bit length n
0 || g(x), otherwise.
3However, in practice, CRHF almost always has the additional property of preimage resistance [19].
4|| denotes concatenation.
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The function h outputs (n + 1)-bit hash values and is collision resistant since finding a
collision for it is equivalent to finding a collision for g. However, finding the preimage of any
hash value beginning with the bit 1 is a trivial task. Thus, h is not preimage resistant.
Keyed hash functions are specifically applied to message authentication, thus they are
called message authentication code algorithms (MACs).
Definition 2.4. A message authentication code algorithm is a family of functions h
parameterized by a secret key k ∈ K where K denotes the key space.
h : {0, 1}∗ ×K −→ {0, 1}n
h(x, k) 7→ hk(x)
h has the following properties:
1. Easy of computation: For a known function hk, given an input x and a value k, hk(x)
is easy to compute. The result is called MAC-value or simply MAC.
2. Compression: hk maps an input x of arbitrary finite bit length to an output hk(x) of
fixed bit length n.
3. Computation-resistance: Given a description of the function family h, for every fixed
allowable value of k (unknown to an adversary) the following holds; given zero or more
message-MAC pairs (xi, hk(xi)), it is computationally infeasible to compute any pair
(x, hk(x)) for any new input x 6= xi (including possibly for hk(x) = hk(xi) for some i).
A MAC forgery occurs if computation-resistance does not hold.
Note that computation-resistance implies the property of key non-recovery, that is, it
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is computationally hard to recover the secret key k, given one or more message-MAC pairs
(xi, hk(xi)) for that k. However, key non-recovery does not imply computation-resistance.
To forge a new MAC, the key need not always to be recovered.
The computation-resistance property should hold whether the messages xi’s with cor-
responding matching MAC-values that are available are given to the adversary (known-text
attack) or freely chosen by the adversary (chosen-text attack). Thus, if hk is a MAC algo-
rithm then hk is against a chosen-text attack without the knowledge of the key k.
Fact 2.4. Let hk be a MAC algorithm. For an adversary not knowing the key k, hk is both
second-preimage resistant and collision resistant.
Justification: Since hk is a MAC, the computation-resistance property holds implying
that the hash values should not even be computable by parties without the secret key k.
Fact 2.5. Let hk be a MAC algorithm. For an adversary not knowing the key k, hk is
preimage resistant with respect to hash input.
Justification: Suppose that hk is not preimage resistant. Then, given a randomly-selected
hash value y it is possible to recover the preimage x. But this violates computation-resistance
property.
2.4 Traditional constructions of hash functions
Modern (unkeyed) hash functions are traditionally constructed using an iterative design. The
idea behind the general model is that hash functions mapping variable bit length messages
into fixed bit length can be constructed by using compression functions that map bit strings
of fixed length to bit strings of shorter length.
Definition 2.5. A compression function is a function that maps elements from {0, 1}n+r to
elements of {0, 1}n where n and r are positive integers.
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Figure 2.1: Classification of hash functions
To construct a hash function, let f : {0, 1}n+r 7→ {0, 1}n be a compression function. A
message x of arbitrary finite length is divided into fixed-length blocks xi each of bit length r,
padding the last block with 0-bits if necessary. Denote the padded message by x = x1x2 · · ·xt.
After preprocessing the message as above, we use each block xi, one at a time, as part
of the input in the iterative process involving f , which computes a new intermediate result
of bit length n. Let Hi denote the partial result after stage i. Define a fixed constant H0
with bit length n as the initial value. The iterative construction of a hash function h can be
modeled as:
H0 = IV ; Hi = f(Hi−1 || xi), 1 ≤ i ≤ t; h(x) = g(Ht).
g is an optional output transformation used in the final step to map the n-bit output to an
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m-bit result, and is often the identity mapping g(Ht) = Ht. The diagram below describe the
construction [19].
Figure 2.2: General model of a hash function construction
For security reasons, Merkle and Damg˚ard proposed to include an additional block xt+1
that contains the bit length of the original message in the preprocessing step of the construc-
tion above. This is known Merkle-Damg˚ard strengthening. The Merkle-Damg˚ard transform
is the iterative process with the application of H0 = 0
n as initialization value and the Merkle-
Damg˚ard strengthening.
Merkle and Damg˚ard, independently, showed that if the underlying compression function
f is collision resistant then the Merkle-Damg˚ard transform gives a hash function that is also
collision resistant.
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2.5 Mathematical hash functions
Most hash functions in use today are constructed using the iterative design describe in the
previous section. These traditionally constructed hash functions are based on performing
several rounds of complex bit operations in sequence with the hope that it is difficult to
reverse. Serious attacks were developed against the two most commonly of these hash func-
tions, the SHA-1 and MD5. Efforts by the research community have been made to replace
such type of hash functions [13, § 4.6.5].
Some of the options proposed is to create hash functions using algebraic structures.
One example of a mathematical function is the modular arithmetic secure hash algorithm
(MASH-1), which somewhat follows the Merkle-Damg˚ard transform but it uses a compression
function based on modular arithmetic. MASH-1 involves the use of an RSA-like modulus N
that should be difficult to factor. Its security is based partially on the difficulty of extracting
modular roots.
Other examples of mathematical functions is the so called provably secure hash functions.
The security of hash functions are based on some hard mathematical problem and finding
collisions of the hash functions is as hard as breaking the underlying problem. Their security
is more than just relying on complex mixing of bits as in the classical approach.
We are interested in hash functions whose constructions are related to the Cayley graphs
of (semi)groups that underly the hard mathematical problem. More about them will be
discussed in the next chapter.
2.6 Practical Security
We conclude this chapter by including some requirements necessary, as a minimum, about
the size of the output of hash functions in order to avoid some known attacks [19].
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Assume that 280 but not fewer operations is considered beyond computational hardness.
Let a hash function outputs hash values of length n bits then the following statements can
be made about n:
• For a OWHF, n ≥ 80 is required.
• For a CRHF, n ≥ 160 is required.
• For a MAC, n ≥ 64 along with secret key of 64-80 bits is sufficient for most applications.
Chapter 3
Cayley hash functions
In this chapter, we present a class of hash functions based on Cayley graphs that are expander
graphs. We start with basic definitions, followed by a general scheme on how to construct
such functions and some examples.
3.1 Cayley graphs
Definition 3.1. A graph is an ordered pair G = (V,E) composed of a vertex set V together
with a edge multiset E. The vertex set V can be any set and the edge multiset E is a
multiset whose elements are of the form {v, w} or {v} where v and w are distinct vertices.
An edge of the form {v} is called a loop.
Definition 3.2. The diameter of G is defined by diam(G) = max
v,w∈V
dist(v, w), that is, the
maximal length of the shortest path between any two vertices v and w. If there is no path
connecting two vertices then conventionally the distance is define as infinite.
Now let G be a multiplicative (semi)group and S = {s1, s2, . . . , sk} be a subset of G.
Definition 3.3. A Cayley graph CG,S = (V,E) is a k-regular graph constructed from the
(semi)group G with respect to S ⊂ G as follows: For each element g ∈ G, V contains a
16
Chapter 3. Cayley hash functions 17
vertex vg associated to g. E contains the directed edge (vg1 , vg2) if and only if there is si ∈ S
for some i such that g2 = g1si. The elements of S are called the graph generators.
If S is stable under inversion (S = S−1) then the graph CG,S is undirected.
CG,S is a connected graph if and only if S generates the whole group G.
3.2 Expander graphs
To define the expansion (or isoperimetric, or Cheeger) constant of a graph, let’s consider a
regular undirected graph G = (V,E) with |V | = n.
For U, S ⊂ V , the set of all edges between U and S is denoted by E(U, S) = {(u, s) | u ∈
U, s ∈ S and (u, s) ∈ E}. The edge boundary of U ⊂ V is ∂U = E(U, U¯).
Definition 3.4. The expansion constant of a graph G = (V,E) is defined by:
h(G) = min
0<|S|≤n
2
S⊂V
|∂S|
|S|
Remark 3.1. By definition of h(G), there exists at least one subset S of vertices such that
h(G) = |∂S||S| . This subset measures the worst case scenario for the graph G, that is, every
other subset of vertices of the graph has a larger boundary relatively to its size.
Example 3.1. Consider the cycle graph C4 shown in Figure 3.1 [15]. To compute its
expansion constant we consider the subsets of size at most n/2 = 2.
Figure 3.2 shows all possible subsets under consideration represented by the white ver-
tices with corresponding boundary set as dashed lines. Therefore, h(C4) = 1.
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Figure 3.1: Graph C4
(a)
|∂S|
|S| = 2 (b)
|∂S|
|S| = 1
1
(c)
|∂S|
|S| = 2
Figure 3.2: Possible subsets with at most 2 vertices of the graph C4
Definition 3.5. A family of expander graphs {Gi}i∈N is a collection of graphs such that:
1. Gi is a d-regular graph of size ni for all i ∈ N (d is a constant for the family).
2. {ni} is a monotone growing sequence that doesn’t grow too fast.
3. For all i ∈ N, h(Gi) ≥  > 01.
In the definition above, we have arbitrarily large graphs but they don’t have a lot of
edges. Each vertex of any graph in the family has d edges. Expander graphs are sparse
graphs that are highly connected. Intuitively, in an expander family of graphs, each graph
is such that every subset S ⊂ V of vertices expands quickly in the sense it is connected to
many vertices outside S.
Example 3.2. Let Cn represent an infinite family of 2-regular cycle graphs as shown in
Figure 3.3. Take the subset S to be the bottom half vertices of Cn. We assume that n is
even. For example, Figure 3.4 shows that S is the set of white vertices for the graph C6.
1The sequence {h(Gi)} is said to be bounded away from zero.
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Thus, | S |= n
2
and | ∂S |= 2 and consequently
h(Cn) = min
0<|S|≤n
2
S⊂V
|∂S|
|S| ≤
|∂S|
|S|
=
2
n
2
=
4
n
If n is odd, then h(Cn) =
4
n− 1. Therefore, h(Cn) → 0 as n → ∞, and so {Cn} is not a
family of expander graphs.
Figure 3.3: The cycle graphs C3, C4, C5 and C6
Figure 3.4: Graph C6 with the bottom half subset of vertices and its boundary
Example 3.3. Let Gn be a random d-regular graph with n vertices. Random graphs are
constructed by connecting each vertex to d randomly chosen vertices. Let S be a subset of
vertices of Gn such that | S |≤ n/2. Then a typical vertex in S will be connected to ≈ d |S¯|n .
Because there are | S | such vertices in S, then
|∂S| ≈ |S| · d |S¯|
n
=⇒ |∂S||S| ≈ d
|S¯|
n
min
0<|S|≤n
2
S⊂V
|∂S|
|S| ≈ min0<|S|≤n2
S⊂V
d
|S¯|
n
.
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The quantity d
|S¯|
n
is minimal when |S¯| is minimal. This happens when |S| is maximal,
that is, |S| = n
2
. Thus, |S¯| = n− |S| = n− n
2
=
n
2
.
We can now conclude that
min
0<|S|≤n
2
S⊂V
|∂S|
|S| ≈
d · n
2
n
h(Gn) ≈ d
2
.
Since h(Gn) does not depend on n, a family of d-regular random graphs is an expander family.
Definition 3.6. Let G = (V,E) with |V | = n be a graph. The adjacency matrix of G,
denoted A(G), is a n × n matrix whose entries correspond to the number of edges between
(v, w) ∈ E. If there are t edges from vertex i to vertex j, then we put t as the entry on row
i, column j of the matrix A(G).
Unless stated otherwise, the following results are for undirected graphs.
The set of eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of a graph is called the spectrum of the
matrix. For an undirected graph, the adjacency matrix is symmetric and thus its eigenvalues2
are real.
Let λi be the eigenvalues of the adjacency matrix of a d-regular graph G with n vertices
satisfy the following properties [12, 15]:
1. λ1 = d ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn ≥ −d
2.
d− λ2
2
≤ h(G) ≤
√
2d(d− λ2)
If Gn is a sequence of d-regular graphs with |Gn| → ∞ and n → ∞ then the following
gives a lower bound on λ = max{|λ2|, |λn|}:
2For directed graphs, we can consider the singular values of the adjacency matrix A = A(G), which are
equal to the square roots of the eigenvalues of the symmetric matrix ATA.
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• λ ≥ 2√d− 1−On(1) where On(1)→ 0 for every fixed d as n→∞.
In property 2 above, the quantity ∆(G) = λ1 − λ2 = d − λ2 is called the spectral gap
of the graph G and gives a good estimation for the expansion constant h(G). It is easier to
compute the spectral gap than enumerating exponentially many subsets of vertices of the
graph and computing the ratios
|∂S|
|S| .
Property 2 also implies that a graph is an expander (h(G) ≥ ) if and only if ∆(G) is
bounded away from zero.
Ramanujan graphs have asymptotically optimal expansion , that is , λ ≤ 2√d− 1.
Lemma 3.1 (Expander Mixing Lemma, Alon-Chung). Let G = (V,E) be a d-regular undi-
rected graph with |V | = n, and λ = max{|λ2|, |λn|}.
For all S, T ⊂ V , ∣∣∣∣|E(S, T )| − d|S||T |n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ λ√|S||T |
Proof. The proof is shown in [12].
λ is the largest absolute value of an eigenvalue other than λ1 = d. The lemma relates
λ with the “randomness” of the graph G. The difference |E(S, T )| − d|S||T |
n
represents the
difference between the actual number of edges connecting the subsets S and T in G , and the
expected number of edges in a random graph. This difference is small when λ is small, that
is, ∆(G) is large. Lemma 3.1 shows that a random walk on an expander graph produces a
walk that looks like a walk on a random graph. Another important characteristic of expander
graphs is that they have logarithmic diameters.
3.3 Cayley hash functions
It is well known that expander family of graphs are used to produce pseudorandom behavior.
This pseudorandom behavior is due to the rapid mixing of Markov chains on expander graphs.
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The idea is to use multiplicative (semi)groups whose Cayley graph are expander graphs to
produce hash functions that are collision-resistant.
In the construction of hash functions from expander Cayley graphs, the input to the
hash function gives directions for walking around the graph (without backtracking), and
the output of the hash is the ending vertex of the walk. Because of the expender mixing
propriety of expander graphs, a random walk on such graphs mixes very fast so the output
of a Cayley hash function will be uniform provided the input was uniformly random.
The following general scheme is designed to construct a hash function from an expander
Cayley graph [35].
Defining parameters:
Let G be a finite (semi)group with a set of generators S that has the same size as the text
alphabet A. Choose a function: pi : A → S such that defines an one-to-one correspondence
between A and S.
Algorithm:
The hash value of the text x1x2 . . . xk is the (semi)group element pi(x1)pi(x2) . . . pi(xk).
One of the advantages of this design is that the computation of the hash value can be
easily parallelized due to the associativity property pi(xy) = pi(x)pi(y) for any x and y in
the (semi)group. Moreover, considering groups with expander Cayley graphs guarantees
equidistribution of the hash values and if the graph has a large girth (the length of the
smallest cycle in the graph), the hash function is protected against small modifications of
the message input.
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3.4 The Tillich-Ze´mor hash function
J. Tillich and G. Ze´mor in their 1994 paper [35] proposed a family of hash functions that
uses the group of matrices SL2 over a finite field of 2
n elements as platform for their design.
Let n be a positive integer and let p(x) be a irreducible polynomial of degree n over F2.
Let A0 and A1 be defined as follow:
A0 =

x 1
1 0
 A1 =

x x+ 1
1 1

Both A0 and A1 have determinant 1 over F2. These matrices are the generators of the
Tillich-Ze´mor hash function.
Let m = m1m2 . . .mk ∈ {0, 1}∗ be a bit string representation of a message and K :=
F2[x]/(p(x)) ≈ F2n . The Tillich-Ze´mor family of functions H : {0, 1}∗ −→ SL2(K) is
determined by the parameter n, the degree of p(x). The hash value of m is just the matrix
product
H(m1m2 . . .mk) = Am1Am2 · · ·Amk mod p(x).
The image of a Tillich-Ze´mor hash function are elements of the special linear group over
the field K. This group consists of 2×2 matrices that have determinant 1 and whose entries
are polynomials with coefficients in F2 and reduced modulo p(x). The operations in this
group are ordinary matrix multiplication and matrix inversion.
The Tillich-Ze´mor hash function, unlike functions in the SHA family, is not a block hash
function, i.e., each bit is hashed individually. More specifically, the “0” bit is hashed to the
matrix A0, and the “1” bit is hashed to the matrix A1. Then a bit string is hashed simply
to the product of matrices A0 and A1 corresponding to bits in this string. For example, the
bit string 11100110 is hashed to the matrix A31A
2
0A
2
1A0.
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Since this function only uses basic operations such as addition in a finite field of char-
acteristic 2 with 2n elements, where the parameter n is in the range of 130-1703, it can be
easily implemented allowing fast computations.
The Tillich-Ze´mor hash function satisfy the homomorphic property, that is, if x and
y are two inputs then H(xy) = H(x)H(y). This property allows parallelization and even
pre-computations when parts of the message is known in advance.
The construction of Tillich-Ze´mor function is based on the Cayley graph associated with
SL2(K). The Cayley graph of the group has a large girth, the function is then protect
against local modifications of the input. The choice of groups such SL2(Fq) by Tillich and
Ze´mor, in particular when q = 2n, is because the matrix generators make it easy to obtain
fast hash functions. Moreover, it is relatively easy to obtain Cayley graphs over these groups
that have large girth.
To find collisions for the Tillich-Ze´mor hash function one needs to find two distinct
sequences of matrix generators such that the corresponding products coincide in the group
SL2(K). The Tillich-Ze´mor hash function was proven secure against early attacks. However,
Grassl et al. [11] introduced a new and very elegant algorithm that finds collisions for this
hash functions. They discovered a particular structure in the hash values of palindromic
messages (messages such that their representation in bit strings are the same backward as
forward). The attack showed that the Tillich-Ze´mor function was not collision resistant and
consequently not even preimage or second preimage resistant.
3later research suggest even larger values for n, see [11]
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3.5 More examples of Cayley hash functions
The Ze´mor hash function was the first instance of Cayley hash functions proposed [38]. This
hash function has as generators the matrices

1 1
0 1
 and

1 0
1 1
 and its hash values
are elements in SL2(Fp) for p prime. The Ze`mor hash function was broken by Tillich and
Ze´mor using lifting attacks [34].
The LPS hash function was proposed by Charles, Goren and Lauter [7] and is based on
the Ramanujan expander graphs of Lubotzky, Philips and Sarnak (1988).
Let p and l be primes, l small and p large, both p and l equal to 1 mod 4, and l being a
quadratic residue modulo p. An LPS graph Xl,p is associated to p and l as follows. Let i be
an integer such that i2 = −1 mod p and the vertices of Xl,p are matrices in G = PSL2(Fp).
The generating set is taken as S = {Gj, j = 1..., l + 1}, where
Gj =

g0,j + ig1,j g2,j + ig3,j
−g2,j + ig3,j g0,j − ig1,j
 , j = 1, . . . , l + 1;
where (g0,j, g1,j, g2,j, g3,j) are all the solutions of g
2
0 + g
2
1 + g
2
2 + g
2
3 = l, with g0 > 0 and
g1, g2, g3 even. Note that S is stable under inversion, so the Cayley graph Xl,p = C(G,S)
is undirected. The LPS hash function is the Cayley hash function associated to C(G,S),
starting at the identity. In [36], Tillich adn Ze´mor provide an attack that find collisions
for the LPS hash function. The attack is somewhat reminiscent of the density attack (see
section 4.2).
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The Morgenstern hash function is a generalization of the LPS hash function from an
odd prime p ≡ 1 mod 4 to a power of prime q. More specifically, the parameter q = 2k is
suggested [28].
Let q be a power of 2 and f(x) = x2 + x +  an irreducible in Fq[x]. Let g(x) ∈ Fq[x]
be irreducible of even degree n = 2d and let Fqn [x] ≈ Fq[x]/(g(x)). The vertices of the
Morgenstern graph Γq are the elements of G = PSL2(Fqn). Let i ∈ Fqn be a root of the
polynomial f(x). The generating set is defined as S = {Gj, j = 1..., q + 1}, where
Gj =

1 γj + δji
(γj + δji + δj)x 1
 , j = 1, . . . , q + 1;
where γj, δj ∈ Fq are all the q+1 solutions in Fq for γ2j +γjδj +δ2j  = 1. Each of the elements
Gj has order 2 and the Cayley graph C(G,S) is an undirected graph. The Morgenstern
hash function is associated to the Cayley Graphs Γq = C(G,S), starting at the identity. A
cryptanalysis of this hash function can be found in [27].
Chapter 4
Cryptanalysis of Cayley hash
functions
4.1 Security of Cayley hash functions
Cayley hash functions have their security properties strongly related to mathematical prob-
lems .
Let G be a (semi)group and S = {s1, . . . sk} ⊂ G be a generating set of G. Let L be of
polylogarithmic (small) in the size of G.
• Balance problem: Find an efficient algorithm that returns two words m1 . . .ml and
m′1 . . .m
′
l′ with l, l
′ < L, mi,m′i ∈ {1, . . . , k} that yield equal products in G, that is,
l∏
i=1
smi =
l′∏
i=1
sm′i
• Representation problem: Find and efficient algorithm that returns a word m1 . . .ml
with l < L, mi ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
l∏
i=1
smi = 1.
• Factorization problem: Find an efficient algorithm that given any element g ∈ G
returns a word m1 . . .ml with l < L, mi ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
l∏
i=1
smi = g.
27
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.
A Cayley hash function is collision resistant if and only if the balance problem is hard
in the underlying (semi)group. If the representation problem is hard in the (semi)group, the
associated Cayley hash is second preimage resistant and, it is preimage resistant if and only
if the corresponding factorization problem is hard in (semi)group [26, 30].
4.2 Attacks against Cayley hash functions
The following represent some possible attacks against Cayley hash functions [11, 26, 30, 34].
4.2.1 Generic attacks
As for the case of any hash function, Cayley hash functions can be vulnerable to exhaustive
search attacks solving the factorization problem in time roughly |G| and to birthday attacks
solving the balance problem in time roughly |G|1/2.
Cayley hash functions are a particular case of the Merkle-Damg˚ard hash functions with
compression function H : G × {1, . . . , k} −→ G sending an intermediary product and a
k-digit to the next intermediary product. Since this compression function can be efficiently
inverted by exhaustive search, the factorization problem can be solved in time roughly |G|1/2
with a meet-in-the-middle approach. To avoid this type of attacks is sufficient to choose
(semi)groups of sufficiently large size.
Differential cryptanalysis is unlike to work in this category of hash functions, especially
if the girth of the Cayley graph is large. In Cayley hash functions, differential attacks are
best replaced by subgroup attacks [26].
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4.2.2 Subgroup attacks
Let G be a group with subgroup sequence G = G0 ⊃ G1 ⊃ G2 ⊃ . . . ⊃ GN = {1}
with |Gi|/|Gi+1| small for all i. Given S = {s1, . . . sk}, we can use the subgroup sequence to
possibly reach the identity by successively going from Gi to Gi+1. If successful, this approach
solves the representation problem in the group.
The procedure is as follows. Generate random products of the si’s until we get an
element s
(1)
1 ∈ G1. Repeat the operations until a set S(1)1 = {s(1)1 , . . . s(1)k′ } that generates
all the elements of G2 is obtained. Then recursively repeat the procedure starting from the
group G1 and the set S(1)1 , and so on. If we use substitutions, we can obtain a representation
with elements of S. This attack has complexity roughly max
i
|Gi|/|Gi+1|. Using a meet-in-
the-middle strategy, one can reduce its complexity to max
i
(|Gi|/|Gi+1|)1/2. We can obtain
s
(1)
1 ∈ G1 more efficiently if random products gj of the si and random products hj of the s−1i
until getting a couple (gj, hj) such that s
(1)
1 := gjh
−1
j ∈ G1. These attacks can be extended
to solve the factorization problem, as well [30].
4.2.3 Lifting attacks
This powerful technique was exploited by Tillich and Ze´mor against the first Cayley hash
function proposed, the Ze´mor hash function [34]. This attack used the fact that any matrix
of SL2(Z+) is a product of

1 1
0 1
 and

1 0
1 1
, that is, these matrices generate a
dense subset in SL2(Z+). The attack is also enable by the fact that each i-th step of the
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Euclidean algorithm ri−2 = qi−1ri−1 + ri can be expressed in matrix form as

ri−2
ri−1
 =

1 qi−1
0 1


1 0
qi 1


ri
ri+1
 .
Furthermore,

1 q
0 1
 =

1 1
0 1

q
and

1 0
q 1
 =

1 0
1 1

q
.
Given any matrix M =

a b
c d
 ∈ SL2(Fp), the factorization problem can be solved
by selecting a matrix M ′ =

A B
C D
 ∈ SL2(Z+) that reduces to M modulo p. To factor
the matrix M ′ we use the Euclidean algorithm is applied to (A,B) in the case that A ≤ B,
else it is applied to (C,D). Since the set of matrices generated by

1 1
0 1
 and

1 0
1 1

is dense in the semigroup SL2(Z+), it makes the cryptanalysis of the Ze´mor hash function
simple. This represents an efficient algorithm since there is a high probability of success of
obtaining relatively small factorizations of a matrix M in the group [34].
To prevent this type of attack, one should choose generators that generate a very slim
(not dense) subset SL2(Z). The Tillich-Ze´mor hash function, which was proposed to replace
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the Ze´mor hash function and whose generators are

x 1
1 0
 and

x x+ 1
1 1
, has density
about 2−n.
Using similar technique, an attack was also provided in [36] to find collisions for the LPS
hash function, where the group unit element is first lifted into a dense subset of SL2(Z) and
then a factorization algorithm is applied in SL2(Z). Moreover, a more elaborated version of
the lifting attack is used to break the Tillich-Ze´mor hash function. The attack against the
Tillich-Ze´mor hash function will be describe in section 4.3.
4.2.4 Finding elements of small order
The group SL2(Fp), used in the Ze´mor hash function, contains some elements of relatively
small order in the group. Trying to find messages that hash to one of such elements of small
order is the goal of the attack that follows.
First, one must compute the hash values of random messages until obtaining a hash
value, which is represented by diagonal matrix. According to Tillich and Ze´mor in [34], on
average about O(p0.6) messages are computed in this search. A matrix is diagonalizable over
Fp if its eigenvalues are in Fp and its minimal polynomial has no repeated roots.
If m is a bit string that hashes to a diagonal matrix M , then M is similar to D =
λ1 0
0 λ2
, where λ1 and λ2 are the eigenvalues of M . Note that Dk =

λk1 0
0 λk2
 and
that ord(M) = ord(D) = lcm(ord(λ1), ord(λ2)).
Because λ1 and λ2 are in F∗p, their orders will divide p− 1. So with the factorization of
p − 1 one can easily compute the orders of the eigenvalues. Thus factoring p − 1 must be
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feasible in order to use this attack, say, something of order less than 260.
If the ord(M) = t, concatenating t copies of the message m will result in a message
that hashes to the identity matrix. Then this concatenation can be inserted into any other
message without changing the hash value of the message and thus providing a collision.
The practicality of this attack depends on the length of the concatenated message being
short. As described in [34], in the case of SL2(Fp) with a randomly chosen p, on average
this attack yields a message whose hash value is of order less than O(p0.4).
This category of attacks can be prevented by choosing a modulo p such that the greatest
non-trivial divisor of p− 1 is sufficiently large.
4.3 The collision algorithm of Grassl et al.
Despite of resisting attacks for 15 years, Tillich-Ze´mor family of hash functions have been
broken by an attack designed by Grassl et al. [11]. We briefly describe the idea behind the
Grassl et al.’s attack.
Let v = m1m2 . . .mk ∈ {0, 1}k be a bit string of length k. We denote by vr =
mkmk−1 . . .m1 the reversal bit string of v. In Grassl et al.’s attack, to find collisions the
authors considered palindromes, that is, bit strings v ∈ {0, 1}∗ such that v = vr.
Consider the two new matrices: S0 =

x 1
1 0
 and S1 =

x+ 1 1
1 0
.
Note that both matrices are in SL2(K) where K := F2n . Also S0 = A0 and S1 =
A−10 A1A0 where A0 and A1 are the original generators of the Tillich-Ze´mor function. These
matrices are the generators considered for the modified function H ′ : {0, 1}∗ −→ SL2(K)
defined by
H ′(m1m2 . . .mk) = Sm1Sm2 · · ·Smk mod p(x). (4.3.1)
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Grassl et al. showed that finding collisions for the Tillich-Ze´mor scheme is equivalent to
finding collisions for the modified function H ′.
Consider now the function (4.3.1) without reduction h′ such that
h′(m1m2 . . .mk) = Sm1Sm2 · · ·Smk .
For palindromes of even length, h′ gives hash values that are symmetric matrices and
using the algorithm presented by Mesirov and Sweet in [20] it is possible to construct m =
m1 . . .mkmk . . .m1 ∈ {0, 1}2k such that h′(0m0) = h′(1m1) +

p2(x) p2(x)
p2(x) 0
 (see [11]).
For palindromes of even length, h′ gives hash values that are symmetric matrices with
entries described by the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. Let m = m1 . . .mkmk . . .m1 ∈ {0, 1}2k be a palindrome of even length.
Let a(0), . . . , a(k) be the following polynomials
a(i) =

1, if i = 0;
x+m1 + 1, if i = 1;
(x+mi)a(i−1) + a(i−2) if 1 < i ≤ k.
Then h′(m) =

a2 b
b d2
 for a = a(k), d = a(k−1) and some b ∈ F2[x]. Moreover,
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h′(0m0) + h′(1m1) =

a2 a2
a2 0
.
For the given irreducible polynomial p(x) ∈ F2[x] used to define K := F2n , one wants to
find a palindrome m of length 2n such that h′(0m0)+h′(1m1) is the zero matrix of dimension
2 over K. From proposition 4.1, the square root of the upper left entry of h′(m) where m
has even length satisfies a reversed order Euclidean algorithm sequence whose quotients are
either x or x + 1. These type of sequences are called maximal length Euclidean sequences.
Mesirov and Sweet [20] showed that when a ∈ F2[x] is a irreducible polynomial there are
exactly two polynomials d such that a and d are the first terms of a maximal length Euclidean
sequence and also provided an algorithm to find such polynomials d.
In the Grassl et al.’s algorithm to find collisions, Mesirov and Sweet’s algorithm is applied
to the irreducible polynomial a = p(x) to compute the polynomial d. The corresponding
bit sequence m1 . . .mn can be computed by applying the Euclidean algorithm to a and d
which will compose the palindrome m = m1 . . .mnmn . . .m1 and, by proposition 4.1, we
have h′(0m0) = h′(1m1) +

a2 a2
a2 0
.
Reducing this equation modulo p(x), we obtain H ′(0m0) ≡ H ′(1m1), which is a collision
of two distinct bit strings under the original Tillich-Ze´mor hash function.
Not only the attack above provide a way of obtaining collisions for the Tillich-Ze´mor hash
function but also it helped Petit and Quisquater [29] to develop an algorithm to compute
preimages for the function.
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4.4 Other considerations about the Tillich-Ze´mor hash
functions
Despite the security issue with Tillich-Ze´mor hash function, it is important to point out
that the Grassl et al.’s attack does not invalidate the general scheme proposed by Tillich
and Ze´mor. The key feature in the cryptanalysis of Tillich-Ze´mor hash function is Mesirov
and Sweet’s algorithm [11], which can only be applied to the specific group of matrices used,
which is specific to quotients x and x+1 in the Euclidean algorithm. Collision and pre-image
resistances are obtained if the matrices A0 and A1 are replaced by the matrices S0 and S1.
Petit and Quisquater [29] suggested that security might be recovered by introducing
some simple redundancy in the messages and it might even be sufficient to replace A0 by A
2
0
or A30 and modifying the underlying group. Similar hash functions can be constructed from
other noncommutative groups and generators.
In a survey about Cayley hash functions [30], Petit and Quisquater also demonstrated
that the Cayley hash function design is still appealing and that it deserves further interest by
the cryptography community by showing that the factorization, representation and balance
problem in non-Abelian groups still are potentially hard problems for general parameters of
Cayley hash functions.
In a recent paper [4], the authors suggested other pairs of matrices, of the form

1 k
0 1

and

1 0
k 1
, k ≥ 2, with the idea that since these matrices generate a free monoid over
Z, there cannot be any short relations over Fp.
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We also offer hashing with a pair of 2 × 2 matrices, but these matrices generate a
semigroup isomorphic to the semigroup (with respect to composition) of linear functions of
one variable over Fp. The corresponding hash functions are very efficient; the time complexity
of hashing a bit string of length n with our method is determined by performing at most 2n
multiplications and about 2n additions in Fp.
Chapter 5
Hashing with compositions of linear
functions
5.1 Basic results
We want to show that certain linear functions generate a free semigroup under function
composition.
Let f0 = p0x + q0 and f1 = p1x + q1 be functions over Z where p0, q0, p1 and q1 are
elements of Z.
For a finite bit string B = (i)
n
i=1, we denote fB = fn ◦fn−1 ◦· · ·◦f2 ◦f1 . For the empty
bit string of length 0, we define f∅(x) = x. For simplicity, we writing fB = fnfn−1 · · · f2f1
for the composition where the rightmost function is applied first.
Lemma 5.1. For every finite bit string B of length n ≥ 1, fB(x) =
(
n∏
i=1
pi
)
x+
n∑
i=1
(
qi
n∏
k=i+1
pk
)
.
Proof. We prove the result by induction on the length n of the bit string B = (i)
n
i=1.
For n = 1, the result holds because fB(x) = f0(x) or fB(x) = f1(x). Suppose that the
result holds for some B = (1, 2, . . . , n) and consider B
′ = (1, 2, . . . , n, n+1). Then
37
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fB′(x) =
(
fn+1fB
)
(x) = fn+1 (fB(x)). Thus,
fB′(x) = pn+1
[(
n∏
i=1
pi
)
x+
n∑
i=1
qi
(
n∏
k=i+1
pk
)]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
fA(x)
+qn+1
= pn+1
(
n∏
i=1
pi
)
x+ pn+1
(
n∑
i=1
qi
n∏
k=i+1
pk
)
+ qn+1
=
(
n+1∏
i=1
pi
)
x+
n∑
i=1
(
qipn+1
n∏
k=i+1
pk
)
+ qn+1
=
(
n+1∏
i=1
pi
)
x+
n∑
i=1
(
qi
n+1∏
k=i+1
pk
)
+ qn+1
=
(
n+1∏
i=1
pi
)
x+
n+1∑
i=1
(
qi
n+1∏
k=i+1
pk
)
If f0 and f1 are two functions that commute then there are distinct bit strings that
yield the same resulting composition. Assume that neither f0 nor f1 is the identity function.
Thus, we investigate what conditions make possible for f0f1 6= f1f0:
(f0f1)(x) = (f1f0)(x) =⇒ p0(p1x+ q1) + q0 = p1(p0x+ q0) + q1 =⇒
p0p1x+ p0q1 + q0 = p1p0x+ p1q0 + q1 =⇒ p0q1 + q0 = p1q0 + q1 =⇒
q1(p0 − 1) = q0(p1 − 1) =⇒ q1
q0
=
p1 − 1
p0 − 1
Thus, even in case that q0 = q1, the functions f0 and f1 don’t commute if p0 6= p1.
5.2 Freeness of semigroups of linear functions
The following is a brief discussion of the results presented by Cassaigne, Harju and Karhuma¨ki
in [6] that the finitely generated semigroup of 2×2 upper matrices over nonnegative integers
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under certain conditions is a free semigroup.
The problem (P) of deciding when two upper-triangular matrices A and B with rational
entries, that is, the matrices of the form
A =

a1 a2
0 a3
 and B =

b1 b2
0 b3

generate a free semigroup is studied.
The authors first noted that in this case one can assume that both the matrices are
invertible, otherwise, they satisfy either A2BA = ABA2 or B2AB = BAB2, and therefore
the semigroup generated by A and B is not free. Also, if one of the matrices is a power of
the second then the generated semigroup can be free, but with one free generator. Thus, the
term “free semigroup” refers to “free with two generators”.
Furthermore, A and B generate a free semigroup if and only if the semigroup generated
by λA and µB is free for any nonzero rational λ and µ.
In proposition 1, they showed that the problem (P) is decidable if and only if the re-
stricted problem (P’) where
A =

a 0
0 1
 and B =

b 1
0 1

where a, b ∈ Q \ {−1, 0, 1} is decidable. Thus, the instance of the restricted problem (P’)
may be encoded by a pair of rational numbers (a, b). They also showed that the instances
(a, b), (b, a),
(
1
a
, 1
b
)
and
(
1
b
, 1
a
)
are equivalent, that is, they have the same answer. In par-
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ticular, each instance of the problem with rational entries is equivalent to one with integer
entries if one chooses suitable rational number λ and µ and then consider the semigroup
generated by λA and µB.
Let A and B be as in the restricted problem (P’), and let νp(x) denotes the p-adic
valuation of x defined by νp
(
pn y
z
)
= n for a prime p and integers n, y, z such that y and z
are not divisible by p.
Theorem 5.2 (Cassaigne, Harju and Karhuma¨ki, 1999). Each of following two conditions
is sufficient for the semigroup generated by A and B to be free:
i) there is a prime p such that νp(a) > 0 and νp(b) > 0;
ii) |a|+ |b| ≤ 1.
The results proved in [6] show that two different words in the semigroup generated by
matrices A =

a1 a2
0 a3
 and B =

b1 b2
0 b3
 are different if A and B do not commute
and a1, b1 ≥ 2.
Let f(x) = ax + b and g(x) = cx + d be two linear functions with integer coefficients.
The semigroup generated by these two functions under composition operation is isomorphic
to the semigroup of matrices generated by the following 2× 2 matrices:
A =

a b
0 1
 , C =

c d
0 1
 .
Then the semigroup generated by f(x) and g(x) is free if f(x) and g(x) do not commute
and a, c ≥ 2.
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Proposition 5.3. Let f(x) = 2x+ 1 and g(x) = 3x+ 1 be linear functions over Z. Then f
and g generate a free semigroup.
Proof. f and g don’t commute since f(x)g(x) = 6x + 3 while g(x)f(x) = 6x + 4. Applying
the inversion (a, c)→ ( 1
a
, 1
c
)
, we see that the pair of functions satisfies
∣∣1
2
∣∣+ ∣∣1
3
∣∣ ≤ 1.
As described above, the elements of S = {f, g} generate a free semigroup, thus the hash
values would grow indefinitely with the length of the input message and they would be in a
subset of a matrix ring with unique factorization. Therefore, the message could be recovered
digit by digit from right to left. Applying modular reductions, some information is lost in
the products and the semigroup generated by S is no longer free and factorization is no
longer trivial [30].
If the coefficients of linear functions are now considered as elements of the field Zp for
some prime p, the computations become reasonably fast and sizable. Moreover, there cannot
be an equality of two different semigroup words in f(x) and g(x) unless at least one of the
coefficients in at least one of the two words is ≥ p.
5.3 Proposed Cayley hash function
We now consider the linear functions f0(x) = 2x + 1 and f1(x) = 3x + 1 over the field Zp
where p > 3. We define the new hash function by the following.
Parameter: p > 3 is a prime number.
Algorithm: Consider the matrices A0 =

2 1
0 1
 and A1 =

3 1
0 1
 and the bit
assignment 0 7→ A0 and 1 7→ A1.
Then compute h(b1b2 · · · bk) = Ab1Ab2 · · ·Abk (mod p).
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The corresponding linear function of the product above is of the form L(x) = rx + s ∈
Zp o Z∗p. The hash value H(b1b2 · · · bk) = (r + s, s).
The definition of the hash value as the pair (r+ s, s) instead of simply (r, s) is because r
does not have a uniform distribution on [0, p). Not all integers on [0, p) can be represented
as a product of form 2n3m modulo p. But r + s presents a uniform distribution since s has
a uniform distribution. More about the distribution of the pair (r + s, s) is presented in
section 5.7.
In this instance of a Cayley hash function, a binary text can be associated to a directed
path in the Cayley graph of the semigroup generated by S = {f0, f1}, with the identity vertex
(identity function) as starting point, and the resulting composition function as its endpoint,
which is then associated to the hash value (r + s, s). Appendix A shows an example of the
Cayley graph of such matrix semigroup with modulo p = 5.
This define a family of hash functions depending on p and they present the following
features:
• Variable size input and fixed output size
• The Cayley graphs of the semigroup have relatively large girth
• Efficient computation
• Pseudorandom
• Collision Resistant
Cryptographic hash functions like SHA-256 and SHA-512 have a maximum input message
size of 264− 1 and 2128− 1 bits, respectively [25]. Theoretically, our family of hash functions
outputs hash values for inputs of any size.
The hash values output by our linear hash function can be encoded as bit strings of
fixed length equal to the length of the parameter p. Any initial and final transformations
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of input or output of the function do not influence its security. Unless otherwise stated, we
will consider our hash function as a function from {0, 1}∗ to the set of elements formed by
the pair (r + s, s) associated to functions generated by products of A0 and A1.
5.4 The semigroup generated by f0(x) = 2x + 1 and
f1(x) = 3x + 1 modulo p
For f0(x) = 2x + 1 and f1(x) = 3x + 1 and by lemma 5.1 , any composition has the form
LB(x) = 2
n03n1x+
n∑
i=1
1 ·
(
n∏
k=i+1
pk
)
where pi = 2 + i with i ∈ {0, 1} and n = n0 + n1.
Proposition 5.4. Let G2(Zp) = 〈A0, A1〉 over Zp where p > 3 is prime. Then
G2(Zp) is a group formed by matrices of the form

a b
0 1
 for some a ∈ Z∗p and b ∈ Zp.
Proof. i) Closure: Let M1 =

a1 b1
0 1
 and M2 =

a2 b2
0 1
 be matrices in G2(Zp).
Then multiplication is closed in G2(Zp) since M1M2 =

a1a2 a1b2 + b1
0 1
 and clearly
a1a2 ∈ Z∗p and a1b2 + b1 ∈ Zp.
ii) Associativity: It follows from the multiplication operation for matrices.
iii) Identity: Let An0 =

a b
0 1
. By lemma 5.1, a ≡ 2n mod p and b ≡ 2n−1 +2n−2 +
· · ·+ 2 + 1 mod p. If An0 = I then (I) 2n ≡ 1 mod p and (II) 2n−1 + 2n−2 + · · ·+ 2 + 1 ≡ 0
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mod p. From (II), 1−2
n
1−2 = 2
n − 1 ≡ 0 mod p =⇒ 2n ≡ 1 mod p. Thus, for n = ord(2) in
Zp, the identity is generated by a power of A0.
iv) Inverses: Note that any matrix M =

a b
0 1
 generated by A0 and A1 has
a ≡ 2n3m mod p and thus a 6≡ 0 because gcd(2, p) = 1 and gcd(3, p) = 1. It follows that a =
det(M) 6= 0 so M is invertible. Moreover, M−1 = 1
detM

1 −b
0 a
 =

a−1 −a−1b
0 1
,
which is of the required form.
Therefore, G2(Zp) is a group.
Not all elements of Z∗p can be written as 2n3m mod p for an arbitrary prime p. We have
that G2(Zp) is a subgroup of G that contains all matrices of the form

a b
0 1
 for a ∈ Z∗p
and b ∈ Zp. The order of G can be found by direct computation. A matrix in this group can
have any of the p − 1 non-zero vectors (a, 0) ∈ Z2p as the first column. The second column
can be any vector of the p vectors (b, 1) ∈ Z2p. This shows that |G| = p(p − 1) and, thus,
|G2(Zp)| divides p(p− 1).
Elements of order 2 and 3 can be recognized as it is shown below.
Proposition 5.5. In the group G2(Zp) = 〈A0, A1〉:
1. The set of elements of order 2 is


p− 1 b
0 1
 ; b ∈ Zp

.
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2. The elements of order 3 must have a ∈ Z∗p whose order is ordZ∗p(a) = 3 and be either
of form:
i)

a 0
0 1
 or
ii)

a b
0 1
 with b 6= 0 and det(M)tr(M) ≡ p− 1 mod p.
Proof. 1. For any matrix M =

a b
0 1
, we have PM(M) = 0 where
PM(λ) = λ
2 − (a+ 1)λ+ a is the characteristic polynomial of M .
ord(M) = 2⇐⇒ I 6= M and I = M2 = (a+ 1)M − aI
⇐⇒ I 6= M and (a+ 1)I = (a+ 1)M
⇐⇒ I 6= M,a+ 1 = (a+ 1)a and (a+ 1)b = 0
⇐⇒ I 6= M,a = ±1 and ab+ b = 0
⇐⇒M =

−1 b
0 1
 ; b ∈ Zp
⇐⇒M =

p− 1 b
0 1
 ; b ∈ Zp.
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2. By direct computation, we have:
ord(M) = 3⇐⇒ I 6= M and I = M3 =

a3 a2b+ ab+ b
0 1

⇐⇒ I 6= M,a3 ≡ 1 mod p and a2b+ ab+ b ≡ 0 mod p.
i) If b = 0, then M =

a 0
0 1
 where a is such that ord(a) = 3 in Z∗p.
ii) If b 6= 0 then
a2b+ ab+ b ≡ 0 mod p
b−1(a2b+ ab+ b) ≡ b−1 · 0 mod p
a2 + a+ 1 ≡ 0 mod p
a(a+ 1) ≡ −1 mod p
det(M)tr(M) ≡ p− 1 mod p
5.5 Girth of the Cayley graph of the semigroup of lin-
ear functions
We first define the girth of a directed graph and then give a lower bound on the minimum
length of bit strings where a collision may occur using the semigroup generated by the
matrices in section 5.3.
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Definition 5.1. The directed girth of a graph G is the largest integer ∂ such that given any
two v and w, any pair of distinct directed paths joining v and w will be such that one of
those paths has length (that is, the number of edges) ∂ or more.
Lemma 5.6. If L(x) = rx + s ∈ Z[x] is a word in f0(x) = 2x + 1 and f1(x) = 3x + 1 of
length n, then r and s are less than or equal to 3n
Proof. We prove by induction on the length n.
If n = 1, then word L(x) is either equal to f0(x) or f1(x). In either case r, s ≤ 3.
Assume the results holds for length n > 1. Then for a word L′(x) of length n + 1 we
have that it is a composition of a word L(x) = rx+ s of length n with either f0(x) or f1(x).
If L′(x) = L(x)f1(x) then L′(x) = r(3x+ 1) + s = 3rx+ r + s. Since 3r ≤ 3 · 3n < 3n+1 and
r + s ≤ 3n + 3n = 2 · 3n < 3n+1, the result of the lemma holds. Similar proof is obtained for
the case that L′(x) = L(x)f0(x).
Proposition 5.7 (Shpilrain and Sosnovski [32]). Let the “0” be hashed to f0(x) = 2x + 1
and the “1” bit be hashed to f1(x) = 3x+ 1. If two distinct bit strings U and V hash to the
same value, then the length of either U or V is at least log3 p.
Proof. Suppose the length of U is n, and the length of V is ≤ n. If L(x) = rx+s is the hash
of U , then by lemma 5.6 both coefficients r and s are less than or equal to 3n. Therefore, if
3n < p, the hashes of U and V cannot be equal because otherwise they would be equal also
over Z, which is impossible.
Thus, if the longer of the two bit strings has length < log3 p, their hashes cannot be
equal over Zp.
For example, if p ≈ 2256, the above hash function cannot have collisions unless the length
of at least one of the colliding bit strings is at least 162, which corresponds to a lower bound
of the girth of the Cayley graph generated by f0(x) = 2x+ 1 and f1(x) = 3x+ 1 over Zp.
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The input bit string for our hash function can have an arbitrary length, while the output
(with our suggested parameters) is a concatenation of two 256-bit number. If we compare
this to the Tillich-Ze´mor hash function [35] and to the hash function in [4], we see that in
these previous proposals, if one uses a field of size 2256, then the size of a hash will be 1024
bits, versus 512 bits in our case, which gives our hash function another advantage as far as
performance is concerned.
Another desirable characteristic of a hash function is to be pseudorandom so that the
hash function distribute uniformly over [0, p), which minimizes the possibility of collisions.
Other properties related to the hash function will be discussed in the following sections.
5.6 Efficiency of composition of linear functions
modulo p
Let B = 1 . . . n represent a bit string, and f0(x) and f1(x) be two linear functions modulo p
where p is a prime. We define LB(x) = f1(x) · · · fn(x) mod p to be the function composition
of f0(x) and f1(x) indexed by B. Then LB(x) = (mx+ b) mod p for some m, b ∈ Zp.
A linear function L(x) = (mx+b) mod p can be uniquely determined by two points. Say
that L(x1) = y1 and L(x2) = y2 are known for x1 6= x2. This gives a system of two equations
in the unknowns m and b. 
mx1 + b ≡ y1
mx2 + b ≡ y2
From the first equation b ≡ y1 − mx1 and by substitution in the second equation, we
obtain m(x1 − x2) ≡ y1 − y2. Since x1 − x2 6= 0 has an inverse in the field Zp then m can be
recovered uniquely and b as well.
We can use the values of LB(0) = b mod p and LB(1) = m + b mod p to construct the
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whole hash function LB(x). Each of the values LB(0) and LB(1) can be computed by using
state transition values in the composition and in parallel. This way, to evaluate the com-
position performed for a bit string of length n, it is necessary to perform 2n multiplications
and 2n additions modulo p. In Zp, each addition requires O(log p) and each multiplication
requires O(log2 p) bit operations [2]. Thus, if p ≈ 2k for a fixed k, each operation mod p
is O(k2), which is constant in n. Thus, the number of bits operations needed to evaluate
HB(x) is O(k2n).
Even though all computations are done in Zp, we can altogether avoid multiplications
during reductions modulo p. This is because coefficients in our linear functions f0(x) = 2x+1
and f1(x) = 3x + 1 are quite small, so when we multiply an integer x < p by 2 or 3 and
it becomes greater than p, all we have to do to reduce it modulo p is to subtract p or 2p.
Therefore, with coefficients at x as small as 2 and 3, multiplications (and inversions) can be
avoided altogether because multiplication by 2 is the same as one addition, and multiplication
by 3 amounts to two additions. Thus, with our suggested parameters, one needs to perform
between 3n and 4n additions and no multiplications to hash a bit string of length n.
It may seem that one inversion is still needed to recover a linear function from its values
at two points, but since the choice of the two points x1, x2 is up to us, we can choose x1, x2
to have x2 − x1 = 1 (as above). Hence inversion is actually not needed.
Moreover, computing any Cayley hash function H can be easily parallelized due to the
homomorphic property H(MN) = H(M)H(N) and the associativity property H(MNP ) =
H(MN)H(P ) = H(M)H(NP ) for any bit strings M,N,P . (Here MN means a simple con-
catenation of M and N .) Thus, a bit string can be split in several pieces, compute the hash
of each piece separately, and then multiply out the hashes (in our situation, multiplication
is composition of linear functions).
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Experimental results of performance
We present below the average times obtained to evaluate the hash values HB(x) at x = 0
for 100 random bit strings B of same bit length. In our experiments we used bit strings
of 100, 200, 400, 800, 1000 and 2000 bits. The following average times only measure the
composition work for the pair of functions f0(x) = 2x + 1 and f1(x) = 3x + 1. The tests
were performed on an Intel Core i7 3.4GHz computer with 8 GB of RAM using Python 3.4.
Table 5.1: Average runtime to evaluate compositions with f0(x) = 2x+1 and f1(x) = 3x+1
modulo p
p
Number of bits in A
100 200 400 800 1000 2000
2127 − 1 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0002s 0.0005s 0.0006s 0.0009s
2137 − 555 0.0s 0.0s 0.0s 0.0003s 0.0006s 0.0008s
2147 − 387 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0002s 0.0009s 0.0005s 0.001s
2157 − 213 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0003s 0.0002s 0.0005s 0.0009s
2167 − 771 0.0002s 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0005s 0.0002s 0.0009s
2177 − 919 0.0002s 0.0002s 0.0s 0.0006s 0.0005s 0.001s
2187 − 477 0.0s 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0005s 0.0005s 0.0009s
2197 − 775 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0002s 0.0008s 0.0002s 0.0009s
2207 − 429 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0s 0.0008s 0.0003s 0.001s
2217 − 675 0.0s 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0005s 0.0006s 0.0009s
2227 − 721 0.0s 0.0s 0.0002s 0.0003s 0.001s 0.001s
2237 − 949 0.0s 0.0s 0.0003s 0.0002s 0.0005s 0.002s
2247 − 309 0.0s 0.0s 0.0s 0.0006s 0.0006s 0.0006s
2256 − 1053 0.0s 0.0s 0.0005s 0.0005s 0.0002s 0.003s
From table 5.1, we conclude that our proposed hash function with parameter p = 2256−
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1053 and without any optimization or parallelization hashes 106 bits in 0.2 seconds in average.
5.7 Pseudorandomness
An ideal hash function should generate outputs as random as possible. We evaluate in two
ways how pseudorandom this new family of hash functions is, we applied the χ2 Goodness-of-
fit test (Pearson’s χ2-test) for testing that the distribution of the hash values as elements of
Zp is uniform [1]. In addition, we also applied the NIST Statistical Test Suite for randomness
to a sequence of hash values in binary form [31][24].
5.7.1 χ2-goodness-of-fit test
A χ2-goodness-of-fit test is used to test whether a frequency distribution fits an expected
distribution.
On average the distribution of the hash values on the input data obtained form our hash
function should be uniformly distributed across its available range.
For the χ2-goodness-of-fit test to be used, the following conditions must be true:
1. The observed frequencies are obtained using a random sample.
2. Each expected frequency must be ≥ 5.
If the conditions are satisfied, the sampling distribution for the test is approximated by
a χ2 distribution with k − 1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number of categories. The
test statistic for the χ2-goodness-of-fit test is
x2 =
k∑
i=1
(Oi − Ei)2
Ei
where Oi represents the observed frequency of each category and Ei represents the expected
frequency of each category.
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If the null hypothesis H0 is true, then by the definition of χ
2
α(k − 1) the probability of
rejecting H0 is P (x
2 > χ2α(k − 1)) = α. Thus, the significance level α is the probability of
rejecting a true H0 (type I error, as in all other hypothesis tests).
It is recommended in [31] to use a level of significance in the range [0.001,0.01]. We
selected α = 0.01 to perform a series of χ2-tests . The critical values χ2α(k − 1) used in our
tests were obtained by using the Chi-Square Calculator, a JavaScript developed by J. Walker
available in [37]. The null hypothesis H0 tested is that the distributions of r + s and s that
form the hash values of the hash function are uniform.
To meet the conditions above for the χ2-test we used a number of bit strings randomly
chosen from a uniform distribution as input in our hash function to generate distributions
of r + s and s values. To satisfy the expected frequency for each bin (category) of at least
5, the number of hash values generated were adjusted based on the number of bins used in
the test. For each prime used as hash function parameter, the test was applied 100 times
and each time with a new distribution of output values. Table 5.2 gives the proportion of
sequences of hash values that passed the test at significance level α = 0.01. k represents the
number of values or intervals used in the tests.
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Table 5.2: χ2-Uniformity Test
p No. of hash values k
Pass rate
r + s s
210 − 3 106 210 − 3 98/100 100/100
211 − 9 106 211 − 9 99/100 98/100
212 − 3 106 212 − 3 99/100 100/100
213 − 3 106 213 − 3 98/100 100/100
214 − 111 106 214 − 111 99/100 100/100
215 − 19 106 215 − 19 98/100 99/100
216 − 99 106 216 − 99 100/100 100/100
217 − 49 106 217 − 49 99/100 99/100
218 − 23 5× 106 218 − 23 100/100 99/100
219 − 85 5× 106 219 − 85 100/100 99/100
220 − 153 8× 106 220 − 153 99/100 100/100
2128 − 275 106 103* 98/100 99/100
2256 − 1299 106 103* 99/100 100/100
We see that both distributions have an average passing rate of 99%, strongly indicating
that they may be indeed uniform.
5.7.2 The NIST Statistical Test Suite
The NIST Statistical Test Suite is a package that include the 15 types of tests, each with a
suitable metric needed to investigate the degree of randomness for binary sequences produced
* For larger primes in the test, we reduced the number of bins because computational issues such as
memory and runtime in performing the tests. Instead of individual values as bins, we used intervals of
integers.
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by cryptographic random generators.
The following are deviations from randomness that each test in the NIST Suite detects
in binary sequences:
• Frequency test - Too many zeroes or ones.
• Block frequency test - Too many zeros or ones within a block
• Runs test - Large (small) total number of runs indicates that the oscillation in the bit
string is too fast (too slow).
• Longest runs of ones test - Deviation of the distribution of long runs of ones.
• Rank test - Deviation of the rank distribution from a corresponding random sequence,
due to periodicity.
• Discrete Fourier Transform (spectral) test - Periodic features in the bit stream.
• Non-overlapping template matchings test - Too many occurrences of non-periodic tem-
plates.
• Overlapping template matchings test - Too many occurrences of m-bit runs of ones.
• Universal statistical test - Compressibility (regularity).
• Linear complexity test - Deviation from the distribution of the linear complexity for
finite length (sub)strings.
• Serial test - Non-uniform distribution of m-length words. Similar to approximate
entropy test.
• Approximate entropy test - Non-uniform distribution of m-length words. Small values
of ApEn(m) imply strong regularity.
• Cumulative sums test - Too many zeroes or ones at the beginning of the sequence.
• Random excursions test - Deviation from the distribution of the number of visits of a
random walk to a certain state.
• Random excursion variant test - Deviation from the distribution of the total number
of visits (across many random walks) to a certain state.
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Each of the tests above has a minimum length for the bits strings (hash values in binary)
tested. If one wishes to apply all the tests in the suite, a minimum of 106 in length is
recommended for the bit strings tested. To meet the minimum requirement, the prime
p = 2 · 19166971 + 1 (see [5]) with bit length of 507,469 was used as parameter for the hash
function to generate bit strings of length 1,014,938 that correspond to the concatenation of
r + s and s. We tested 100 of such bit strings. The level of significance applied used in the
suite is α = 0.01.
Table 5.3 presents the statistical properties of the hash values as reported by the NIST
test suite. According to NIST documentation, a pass rate of 96% is acceptable.
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Table 5.3: NIST Statistical Suite Results
Number Statistical test p-value Pass rate
1 Frequency 0.779188 98/100
2 Block frequency 0.262249 97/100
3 Cumulative sums 1 0.090936 98/100
4 Cumulative sums 2 0.798139 98/100
5 Runs 0.739918 100/100
6 Longest runs of ones 0.816537 99/100
7 Rank 0.066882 98/100
8 FFT 0.366918 99/100
9..156 Non-overlapping templates (148 tests) 0.511260 (mean) 99/100 (mean)
157 Overlapping template 0.096578 98/100
158 Universal 0.678686 98/100
159 Approximate entropy 0.137282 100/100
160..167 Random excursions (8 tests) 0.313954 (mean) 64/65 (mean)
168..185 Random excursions (variant - 18 tests) 0.508271 (mean) 64/65 (mean)
186 Serial 1 0.834308 99/100
187 Serial 2 0.191687 99/100
188 Linear complexity 0.798139 97/100
We note that all but one of the tests passed according to the NIST acceptability rate.
One of the 148 non-overlapping template tests had pass rate of 95/100 (just below of the
recommended 96%) but overall it passed the non-overlapping tests with average 99/100. The
bit strings output by our hash also passed each individual random excursions and random
excursions variant tests performed, though we only present here the averages results for those
tests.
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5.8 Security
5.8.1 Generic attacks
Generic attacks use a “birthday paradox” kind of argument and involves a “brute force”
search over all bit strings of a length depending on the size of the underlying field. In our
situation, since we have a solid lower bound of 162 for the minimum length of colliding bit
strings (if p is on the order of 2256), a similar approach would involve a brute force search
over bit strings of length about 80, which is considered computationally infeasible, so the
“birthday paradox” reduction is simply not enough to make the attack feasible with our
suggested size of p.
5.8.2 Subgroup attacks
Subgroup attacks can be prevented by choosing the group G carefully. The minimal require-
ment is that the cardinality of G has a “large” factor [34, 30]. One possibility is to use
a prime p = 2q + 1 for some large prime q (e.g. safe primes). It may be that additional
requirements may be needed.
5.8.3 Finding elements of small order
Using a ground group as Zp where the prime p is such that p − 1 = 2q with a large prime
q can also help preventing attacks using elements of small order. The goal is to find a bit
string that hashes to one of such elements of small order, then insert a number (equal to the
order) of copies of this bit string whose matrix is of small order into the hash of another bit
string. This is equivalent to insert the identity matrix in the hash value and consequently
obtaining a collision with the corresponding messages.
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In the case of elements of order 2, which is of the form M =

p− 1 b
0 1
 where b ∈ Zp,
this means that we looking for a message of “large” length since the proposed hash function
is generated by positive powers of A0 and A1 with the matrix coefficient very small and
M has a large upper left element. The practicality of this attack depends on the resulting
concatenating input message being short.
In general, let ord(M) = t and M =

2n03n1 b
0 1
 where b ∈ Zp, n0, n1 > 1 are integers
and corresponding message of length ` = n0 + n1. Then M
t = I implies that at least we
have must (2n03n1)t ≡ 1 mod p =⇒ (2n03n1)t = 1 + kp with k ≥ 1 =⇒ (2n03n1)t > kp =⇒
(3n03n1)t > kp =⇒ 3(n0+n1)t > kp =⇒ 3`t > kp =⇒ log 3`t > log k + log p =⇒ ` > log p
t log 3
.
If t = 2 and p ≈ 2256 then l > 80. Hence, one must find a bit string of length at least
80 and insert two copies of it into another bit string to provide a collision. The exhaustive
search of a bit string m of minimum length 80 bits such that its hash value is a matrix M
of order 2 is considered out of reach today.
Also note that if the prime p is such that p− 1 = 2q with q prime and that the matrix
group |G2(Zp)| divides p(p − 1) = 2pq, this leaves only matrices of order 2 (small order) in
G2(Zp) to be used in this type of attack.
5.8.4 Lifting attacks
Probably the most powerful attack is the lifting attack [34]. The idea is to find a preimage
of a given hash in the ambient free (semi)group by “splitting out” one (semi)group generator
at a time, so that the “size” of the result would decrease at every step. In our context, where
the hash is the pair (r + s, s) corresponding to the function LB(x) = rx + s over Fp, one
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would lift LB(x) to a linear function Rx + S over Z (i.e., R = r + k1p and S = s + k2p for
some k1, k2 ∈ Z) and try to multiply it by either f−10 (x) or f−11 (x) to decrease one or both
coefficients (or, perhaps, to decrease their sum). However, there are two major obstacles that
basically make this attack void. The main obstacle is that lifting itself in our situation is by
no means unique, and there is no way to tell just by inspection which one is a “good” lifting.
This is in sharp contrast with the situation considered in [34] where a “good” lifting can be
detected by inspection. Since LB(x) = 2
n03n1x +
n∑
i=1
1 ·
(
n∏
k=i+1
pk
)
with pi ∈ {2, 3}, the
only necessary condition for a lifting to be “good” in our situation is that the coefficient at x
should be of the form 2n03n1 , but the only condition (visible by inspection) on the constant
term S is that S− 1 is either divisible by 2 or 3, which leaves a lot of possibilities for lifting.
The other obstacle is that splitting out a generator in this case is not unique either,
because at every step of the procedure, one would have the constant term S such that S− 1
is divisible by 2 or 3 with non-negligible probability, thus creating a tree of possible reduction
sequences, where only one sequence is correct (assuming that the lifting was “good” to begin
with, so that there is actually a correct sequence). Thus, even if the attacker was lucky to
pick a “good” lifting, he will still have to search over exponentially many (in the length of an
input bit string) possible reduction sequences. To be fair though, this problem is relatively
insignificant compared to the problem of finding a “good” lifting for the constant term s.
Chapter 6
Semi-primitive roots and the discrete
logarithm modulo 2k
In this chapter, we establish a connection between semi-primitive roots of the multiplica-
tive group of integers modulo 2k where k ≥ 3, and the logarithmic base in the algorithm
introduced by Fit-Florea and Matula [9] for computing the discrete logarithm modulo 2k.
Fit-Florea and Matula used properties of the semi-primitive root 3 modulo 2k to obtain their
results and provided a conversion formula for other possible bases, that is, other possible
semi-primitive roots . We show that their results can be extended to any semi-primitive
root modulo 2k and also present a generalized version of their algorithm to find the discrete
logarithm modulo 2k.
Let Z∗n be the multiplicative group of integers modulo n. Lee, Kwon, Kang and Shin
[17] define an integer h as a semi-primitive root modulo n if the order of h in Z∗n is equal to
φ(n)/2 1.
1φ(n) is the Euler’s totient function
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Theorem 6.1 (Lee, Kwon, Kang and Shin, 2011).
Suppose that Z∗n ∼= C2×Cφ(n)/2. Then there exist a semi-primitive root h ∈ Z∗n such that
Z∗n =
{
±hi mod n : i = 0, . . . , φ(n)
2
− 1
}
.
Since Z∗
2k
∼= Z2 ×Z2k−2 for all k ≥ 3, we can represent Z∗2k in terms of its semi-primitive
roots as Z∗
2k
= 〈−1〉 × 〈h〉.
Corollary 6.2. For k ≥ 3 and any semi-primitive root h in Z∗
2k
,
Z∗2k = {±hi mod 2k : i = 0, . . . , 2k−2 − 1}.
Nathanson in [23, § 3.2] presented results showing that 5 is a semi-primitive root modulo
2k for k ≥ 3, that is,
Z∗2k = {±5i mod 2k : i = 0, . . . , 2k−2 − 1}.
Fit-Florea and Matula [9] used the semi-primitive root 3 modulo 2k for k ≥ 3 as the base
for their discrete logarithm algorithm. Because of the algebraic properties of semi-primitive
roots modulo 2k, we can extend their results to find the discrete logarithm modulo 2k using
any semi-primitive root in Z∗
2k
as the logarithmic base.
The notation |m|2k = j represents the congruence relation m ≡ j mod 2k where k ≥ 3
and 0 ≤ j ≤ 2k − 1. The multiplicative inverse |m−1|2k exists for all odd m with 0 < m ≤
2k − 1.
Half of the odd integers modulo 2k can be expressed as positive powers of h, that is,
as |hi|2k for some i while the other half can be expressed as negative powers of h, that is,
| − hi|2k .
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Any k-bit integer x = xk−1xk−2 . . . x1x0 can be represented by a triple (s, p, e) such that
x = |(−1)s2phe|2k with s = {0, 1}, 0 ≤ e ≤ 2k−2 − 1 and 0 ≤ p < 2k. Denote dlg(h,k)(x) the
discrete logarithm e modulo 2k with respect to base h.
Similarly to what was suggested in [9], the discrete logarithm factorization x = |(−1)s2phe|2k
is uniquely determined by first factoring out the largest power 2p dividing x as the even part
factor and employing the discrete logarithm factorization |(−1)she|2k−p to provide the odd
part factor.
6.1 The digit inheritance property
Given an integer with binary representation x = xn−1xn−2 . . . x2x1x0 then for 1 ≤ k ≤ n− 1,
|x|2k = |xn−1xn−2 . . . x0|2k = xk−1xk−2 . . . x0,
that is, reduction modulo 2k is obtaining by simply truncating the leading portion of the bit
string.
An integer operation z = x ⊗ y has the digit inheritance property if for all nonnegative
integers x and y,
|z|2k =| |x|2k ⊗ |y|2k |2k for all k ≥ 1.
An integer function z = f(x) has the digit inheritance property if for all nonnegative
integers x,
|z|2k =| f(|x|2k) |2k for all k ≥ 1.
The digit inheritance property states that for operations and functions with this property,
the low order k bits of the input arguments determine the low order k bits of the output for
all k ≥ 1.
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Integer addition and multiplication operations, and the exponentiation and inverse func-
tions satisfy the digit inheritance property.
6.2 Properties of the discrete logarithm modulo 2k
In this section, we present mathematical results that will be used to generalize the Fit-Florea
and Matula’s discrete logarithm algorithm. These results were proved in [9] using the specific
logarithmic base 3 and are provided here for the reader’s convenience. The generalization of
the results is possible because depend on the order of the base and so can be adapted to any
semi-primitive root.
Lemma 6.3. Let h be a semi-primitive root modulo 2k, k ≥ 3. For any odd residue A, either
A or its additive inverse −A is congruent to some power of h modulo 2k.
Proof. Apply Corollary 6.2.
From now on, let A be an odd residue modulo 2k that can be express as a positive power
of a semi-primitive root h.
Lemma 6.4 (Generalized version – Fit-Florea and Matula, 2011). Let B = |A−1|2k . Then
dlg(h,k)(A) + dlg(h,k)(B) = 2
k−2 for k ≥ 3.
Proof. If a = dlg(h,k)(A) and b = dlg(h,k)(B), then |A|2k = |ha|2k and |B|2k = |hb|2k . Because
h is a semi-primitive root modulo 2k, we have that |h2k−2|2k ≡ 1.
Since |AB|2k ≡ 1, then |AB|2k ≡ |h2k−2|2k and |hahb|2k ≡ |ha+b|2k . It follows that
a+ b = 2k−2.
If the discrete logarithm mod 2k is known for B, the multiplicative inverse of A, then we
can compute dlg(h,k)(A) = 2
k−2 − dlg(h,k)(B).
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Lemma 6.5 (Generalized version – Fit-Florea and Matula, 2011). For k > 3 and h any
semi-primitive root mod 2k, we have that |h2k−3 |2k = |2k−1 + 1|2k .
Proof. Let A = |2k−1 + 1|2k . We have that A = A−1 since |A2|2k ≡ |(2k−1 + 1)2|2k ≡
|22(k−1) + 2 · 2k−1 + 1|2k ≡ |1|2k .
From Lemma 6.4, dlg(h,k)(A)+dlg(h,k)(A
−1) = 2k−2 =⇒ 2 ·dlg(h,k)(A) = 2k−2. Therefore,
dlg(h,k)(A) = 2
k−3.
Corollary 6.6. dlg(h,k)(2
k−1 + 1) = 2k−3.
Corollary 6.7 (Digit inheritance of the discrete logarithm). The low order (i−2) bits of the
discrete logarithm function dlg(h,k)(x) depend only on the low order i bits of the argument x
for 3 ≤ i ≤ k.
We can apply Lemma 6.5 to compute the discrete logarithm modulo 2i of residues
(2i−1 + 1) mod 2i for any i.
Lemma 6.8 (Generalized version – Fit-Florea and Matula, 2011). For any k > 3,
dlg(h,2k)(A) = dlg(h,2k−1)(A)
or
dlg(h,2k)(A) = dlg(h,2k−1)(A) + 2
k−3.
Proof. Let a′ = dlg(h,2k−1)(A) and a = dlg(h,2k)(A). So |ha′|2k−1 = |A|2k−1 and |ha|2k = |A|2k
Because of the digit inheritance property, ha and ha
′
have the same digits whose binary
weights are 2k−2, . . . , 21, 20.
If their digits with weight 2k−1 are the same then |ha|2k = |ha′ |2k . Therefore, a = a′.
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If not the same, we must have that |ha′ + 2k−1|2k = |ha|2k .
Since |ha′ × 2k−1|2k = |2k−1|2k , we have that
|ha′(2k−1 + 1)|2k = |ha′2k−1 + ha′ |2k = |2k−1 + ha′ |2k = |ha|2k (6.2.1)
Applying Lemma 6.5,
|ha′(2k−1 + 1)|2k = |ha′h2k−3|2k = |ha′+2k−3|2k (6.2.2)
Comparing (6.2.1) and (6.2.2), |ha|2k = |ha′+2k−3|2k . Therefore, a = a′ + 2k−3.
This result allows for the computation of dlg(h,k)(A) one bit at a time.
6.3 The Digit-Serial Discrete Logarithm Algorithm
The following results are used to distinguish the positive powers of h from the negative ones.
Lemma 6.9. Let A be an odd positive integer with |A|2k = ak−1ak−2 . . . a2a11 then:
i) If A ≡ 1 mod 4 then a1 = 0.
ii) If A ≡ 3 mod 4 then a1 = 1.
Proof. i) If A ≡ 1 mod 4 then A = 1 + 4q for some integer q ≥ 0. Because of the digit
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inheritance properties of the addition and multiplication modulo 2k,
|A|2k = |1|2k + ||4|2k · |q|2k |2k
ak−1ak−2 . . . a2a11 = 0 . . . 0001 + |0 . . . 0100× qk−1qk−2 . . . q2q1q0|2k
= 0 . . . 0001 + qk−3qk−4 . . . q2q1q000
= qk−3qk−4 . . . q2q1q001
Thus, a1 = 0.
ii) Similarly for the case A ≡ 3 mod 4, we have that |A|2k = |3|2k + ||4|2k · |q|2k |2k . It
follows from |3|2k = 0 . . . 0011 that |A|2k = ak−3ak−4 . . . a2a1a011. Therefore, a1 = 1.
Theorem 6.10. Let h be a semi-primitive root mod 2k, k ≥ 3. For all positive powers of h
with bit string |A|2k = ak−1ak−2 . . . a2a11 we have that:
i) If h ≡ 1 mod 4 then a1 = 0.
ii) If h ≡ 3 mod 4 then a2 = 0.
Proof. i) If h ≡ 1 mod 4 then hi ≡ 1 mod 4 for any i ∈ N. By lemma (6.9), we must have
a1 = 0.
ii) If h ≡ 3 mod 4 then h2 ≡ 1 mod 4. So the powers of h are of the form h2i ≡ 1
mod 4 or h2i+1 ≡ 3 mod 4 for all i ∈ N. Both 1 and 3 have binary representation with
a2 = 0.
The bit strings of the negative powers of h are two’s complements of the positive powers,
hence if h ≡ 1 mod 4 then a1 = 1, and if h ≡ 3 mod 4 then a2 = 1.
This was noted in [9] for the semi-primitive root 3 where positive powers of 3 mod 2k
have binary digit a2 = 0, while the negative powers of 3 mod 2
k have binary digit a2 = 1.
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Corollary 6.11. Let |h|2k = hk−1hk−2 . . . h2h11 be a semi-primitive root modulo 2k. For all
positive powers of h modulo 2k whose binary representation is |A|2k = ak−1 . . . a2a11:
If h1 + 1 =
1 then a1 = 02 then a2 = 0.
Proof. This follows from lemma (6.9) and theorem (6.10).
Therefore, one can identify if an integer A modulo 2k is a negative power of h by checking
if it satisfies one of the following conditions:
i) h1 = 0 and a1 = 1
ii) h1 = 1 and a2 = 1
In algorithm 1 below, let |B|2k = |A−1|2k and b = dlg(h,k)(B).
Algorithm 1 finds the discrete logarithm modulo 2k whose base is a semi-primitive root.
With the present results there is no need for conversion to find the discrete logarithm for
bases other than 3 and the algorithm remains efficient.
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Algorithm 1 Generalized FitFlorea-Matula DLG Digit-serial Algorithm
Input: Odd integer |A|2k = ak−1ak−2 . . . a2a11
Semi-primitive root |h|2k = hk−1hk−2 . . . h2h11
Output: The factorization (s, e) of A as A ≡ |(−1)she|
1: B := 1; . Binary representation of 1 with k bits
2: b := 0; . Binary representation of 0 with k − 2 bits
3: if (h1 = 0 and a1 = 1) or (h1 = 1 and a2 = 1) then . Identify the cases that A is a
negative power of h
4: P := | − A|2k ; . The two complement of A
5: s := 1;
6: else
7: P := |A|2k ;
8: s := 0;
9: end if
10: if |P |23 = |h|23 then . |P |23 = 001 or |P |23 = |h|23 are the only possibilities
11: B := |h|2k ;
12: b := 1;
13: end if
14: P := |P ×B|2k : . Binary multiplication of k-digit numbers
15: for i from 3 to k − 1 do
16: if pi = 1 then
17: b := b+ 2i−2; . This flips the (i− 1)-th bit of b
18: B := |B × h2i−2|2k ;
19: P := |P × h2i−2 |2k ;
20: end if
21: end for
22: e = |2k−2 − b|2k−2
23: return (s, e)
Chapter 7
Products of powers of semi-primitive
roots equal to 1 in the ring of integers
modulo 2127
In this chapter we consider the following problem involving semi-primitives modulo 2127.
Let o5 = ordZ/2127Z(5) and o3 = ordZ/2127Z(3) be the orders of 5 and 3 in the multiplicative
ring Z/2127Z, respectively. Then 5 and 3 are semi-primitive roots modulo 2127 because
o5 = o3 = 2
125.
Problem 7.1. Consider the set E = {(k, l) ∈ (Z/2126Z)2 | 5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2127}. Find a
lower bound for the set M = {k + l | (k, l) ∈ E and k, l > 0}.
Problem 7.1 can be generalized as finding the minimal sum of exponents k and l such
that hk1 · hl2 ≡ 1 mod 2k where h1 and h2 are semi-primitives for k ≥ 3.
Using a “birthday paradox” argument, we can heuristically obtain an upper limit for this
problem. Since gcd(5, 2127) = 1 and gcd(3, 2127) = 1, we can consider our modular equation
in the form 5k ≡ 3−l mod 2127. Among the first m1 values of 5k and the first m2 values of
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3−l, we have m1m2 different potential collisions. Treating these as independent events we
can expect each of them to yield an actual collision with probability 1
2127
, that is, within
approximately 2127 potential collisions we should expect an actual collision. Since m1 + m2
is minimized for a given value of m1m2 when m1 = m2, then we should expect the minimum
value of m1 + m2 to occur where m1 ≈ m2. Since m1m2 ≈ 2127 yields m1 ≈ m2 ≈ 264 and
m1 +m2 ≈ 265. As long as m1  log5 2127 ≈ 55 and m2  log3 2127 ≈ 80, then we can expect
the sets {5k | 0 ≤ k < m1} and {3−l | 0 ≤ l < m2} to be roughly equidistributed mod 2127.
Nevertheless, a lower value can be obtained on using other imposed relations between the
exponents k and l.
The set E = {(k, l) ∈ (Z/2125Z)2 | 5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2127} can be interpreted as a subspace
of (Z/2125Z)× (Z/2125Z).
Lemma 7.2. Given k, l ∈ Z/2n−1Z such that 5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2n, then 5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2n−1.
Proof. Suppose that for k, l ∈ Z/2n−1Z we have
5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2n. Then:
5k · 3l = 1 + t · 2n, for some t ∈ Z
5k · 3l = 1 + t · 2 · 2n−1
5k · 3l = 1 + t′ · 2n−1
5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2n−1
In general, the converse is not true. In the case of the modulus 2n, given a solution to
5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2n−1, we can try to lift (k, l) from Z/2n−1Z to Z/2nZ by applying Lemma
6.8.
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Fact 7.3. Let c = 40647290924413185736448652556727923386, then the set E ′ = {(cm, 2m) |
m ∈ Z} is a subset of E.
With this, we can write k + l = (cm mod 2125) + (2m mod 2125) with 0 < m < 2125.
Some basic results related to the exponents in problem 7.1 are shown below. The notation
ord(a) denotes the order of the element a in the ring Z/2127Z.
Lemma 7.4. Let k and ` be integers such that 5k · 3` ≡ 1 mod 2127. Then k and ` must be
even.
Proof. First consider the case when k = `. Then 5k · 3` ≡ 1 mod 2127 =⇒ (5 · 3)k ≡
1 mod 2127 =⇒ 15k ≡ 1 mod 2127 =⇒ ord(15) | k. Since ord(15) = 2123, we have that
2123 | k. Thus k is even and so is `.
Now we consider when k 6= `. Without loss of generality, we take k > `, say k = ` + m
for some positive integer m. Hence,
5k · 3` ≡ 1
5`+m · 3` ≡ 1
5` · 3` · 5m ≡ 1
15` ≡ 5−m
(15`)ord(15) ≡ (5−m)ord(15)
1 ≡ (5−1)m·ord(15) (7.0.1)
Since ord(5−1) = ord(5) = 2125 and from congruence (7.0.1) we see that ord(5−1) | mord(15).
Then 2125 | m · 2123 =⇒ m · 2123 = 2125 · u, for some u ∈ Z =⇒ m = 22 · u =⇒ m is even.
Because m is even and m = k − `, both k and ` are even or both are odd.
Suppose that both k and ` are odd.
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Since ord(5) = ord(3) = 2125, let o denote the orders of the elements 5 and 3. The
congruences 5k · 3` ≡ 1 mod 2127 and 5o · 3o ≡ 1 mod 2127 imply that 5k · 3` ≡ 5o · 3o. Thus,
5k−o ≡ 3o−`. So the order of 5k−o and the order of 3o−` must be the same in Z/2127Z.
Thus,
5k−o ≡ 3o−` =⇒ o
gcd(o, k − o) =
o
gcd(o, o− `) =⇒ gcd(o, k − o) = gcd(o, o− `)
Let d = gcd(o, k− o). Thus, d divides o, k− o and o− `. If d | o then d | 2125. Hence d is
even and consequently k − o and o− ` are also even. By assumption, k and ` are odd, then
k − o = (2q + 1) − 2q′ = 2(q − q′) + 1 for some q, q′ ∈ Z, which is a contradiction. Similar
contraction is obtained for o− `.
Corollary 7.5. k + ` is divisible by 4.
Proof. If k = ` and using the same argument in the proof above, then ord(15) = 2123 | k.
Hence, 4 | k and 4 | `. Consequently, 4 | (k + `). Suppose that k 6= l. Without loss of
generality, we assume that k > `, that is, k = `+m for some positive integer m.
According to Lemma 7.4, k, ` and m are even. Thus,
k + ` = `+ `+m
= 2q + 2q +m, q ∈ Z
= 4q +m (7.0.2)
Also in the proof of Lemma 7.4, we showed that m is of the form m = 22u for some u ∈ Z.
Therefore, 4q +m = 4q + 4u =⇒ 4 | (k + `).
Using the results about the discrete log with base semi-primitive roots from previous
chapter, we can lift a solution of 5k32 mod 23 to find that 5c32 ≡ 1 mod 2127 using the
following “depth-first search” algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 Recursive algorithm that finds exponent modular
with two generators mod2127
Input: 5k · 32 ≡ 1 mod 23, for some k ∈ Z>0
Output: 5c · 32 ≡ 1 mod 2127, c ∈ Z>0
1: Let k be such that 5k32 ≡ 1 mod 23 (k = 2);
2: n = 4;
3: while n ≤ 127 do
4: if 5k32 ≡ 1 mod 2n then
5: n→ n+ 1;
6: else
7: k → 2n−3 + k; . Applying lemma 6.8
8: end if
9: end while
10: return k
The algorithm returns c = 40647290924413185736448652556727923386. Now we can use
continued fractions of c/2n to obtain small values of (cm mod 2n) and consequently of l+ k.
We want to obtain the smallest value of r such that c = i · r for some i ∈ Z and also
r | 2n, that is, 2n = j · r for some j ∈ Z. Therefore, c
2n
=
i
j
.
Using a simple and fast SAGE algorithm, we have that the continued fraction of c/2127 is
[0, 2, 10, 1, 3, 4, 37, 1, 1, 1, 6, 1, 58, 1, 4, 14, 5, 7, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 1, 8, 1, 9, 12, 1, 8, 1, 1,
1, 2, 1,5, 2, 36, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 6, 3, 1, 4, 1, 8, 1, 2, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 6, 1, 16, 1,
18, 1, 3, 1, 4, 4, 1, 61, 1, 10].
The lowest values of k and l found so far are
lo = 11726533429350798020
k0 = 391079140617450804
l0 + k0 = 12117612569968248824
For the values above we have 263 < l0 + k0 < 2
64, which so far is in accordance with the
“birthday paradox” argument.
An exhaustive search on small values of k and l was also attempted. Applying lemma
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7.4 and corollary 7.5, we searched even exponents whose sum is a multiple of 4 in the range
0 < k, l ≤ 220 but none of such exponents resulted in the congruence 5k · 3l ≡ 1 mod 2127.
Therefore, it remains an open problem to find a lower bound on k+l such that the congruence
above is satisfied.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Cayley hash functions are elegant cryptographic hash functions constructed from Cayley
graphs. We have described a new Cayley hash where “0” and “1” bits are hashed by linear
functions over Fp. We suggested the pair of linear functions f0(x) = 2x+1 and f1(x) = 3x+1.
Our proposal is very efficient and it is possible to compute the hash values without even
using multiplications, hence performing between 3n and 4n additions in Fp to hash a bit
string of length n. In addition, the computation of any Cayley hash function can be easily
parallelized, which can improve the efficiency of our proposal. This new proposed hash
function outputs values of length 2 log p while other proposals also using matrices over Fp to
hash output values of length 4 log p.
We also evaluated how random the outputs of our hash function are. It has successfully
passed all the pseudorandomness tests in the NIST Statistical Test Suit and the Pearson’s
goodness of fit test performed.
A lower bound of log3 p for the girth of the Cayley graph of the semigroup generated by
f0(x) and f1(x) is given, that is, a lower bound on the length of bit strings that may result
in collisions. If p is on the order of 2256 (or larger), then with the suggested pair of linear
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functions, our hash function does not have collisions unless the length of at least one of the
colliding bit strings is at least 162.
After analyzing known attacks on Cayley hash functions succeeding against our proposed
hash, we suggested also that the prime p be such that p−1 = 2q where q is prime. With p of
this form, attacks using subgroup structure and elements of small order can be prevented. In
our analysis, we also determined that there are obstacles that make the lifting attack difficult
against our hash function since it seems that there is no clear way of finding a “good” lifting
in this scenario. Therefore, we conclude there is no visible threat to the security of our
proposed hash function.
We concluded this work with the presentation of the discrete logarithm algorithm de-
scribed by Fit-Florea and Matula in [9] and therein results extended to any semi-primitive
root modulo 2k as logarithmic base. The adjustments do not change the efficiency of the
algorithm, which requires O(k) number of binary additions and multiplications. With the
general results presented here, the discrete logarithm modulo 2k can be computed directly
for bases other than 3.
Appendices
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Figure A.1: Cayley graph of matrix semigroup generated by f(x) = 2x+1 and g(x) = 3x+1
modulo p = 5.
Appendix B
Python algorithm for the runtime of
evaluating compositions of modular
linear functions
###################################################
############# Composition Runtime ############
###################################################
# This func t i on computes the runtime to eva luate the
# compos it ion o f l i n e a r f un c t i on s f=ax+b and g=cx+d
# Python
o = open ( ’ summary primes . txt ’ , ’w ’ ) ;
t ex t= ”Summary primes python . txt ” ;
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#
text= ”Evaluat ion o f the hash H(x ) at x=0”;
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#
text0=”comptime prime ” ;
#
import time
from random import ∗
#
# Function that gene ra t e s a random b i t s t r i n g o f l ength m
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de f randBinList (m) :
B=[ rand int (0 , 1 ) f o r t in range (1 ,m+1) ] ;
r e turn B
# Moduli
primes=[2∗∗127−1 , 2∗∗137−555 , 2∗∗147−387 , 2∗∗157−213 , 2∗∗167−771 ,
2∗∗177−919 , 2∗∗187−477 , 2∗∗197−775 , 2∗∗207−429 , 2∗∗217−675 ,
2∗∗227−721 , 2∗∗237−949 , 2∗∗247−309 , 2∗∗256−1053];
#
s t r p r ime s =[ ’2ˆ127−1 ’ , ’2ˆ137−555 ’ , ’2ˆ147−387 ’ , ’2ˆ157−213 ’ ,
’2ˆ167−771 ’ , ’2ˆ177−919 ’ , ’2ˆ187−477 ’ , ’2ˆ197−775 ’ , ’2ˆ207−429 ’ ,
’2ˆ217−675 ’ , ’2ˆ227−721 ’ , ’2ˆ237−949 ’ , ’2ˆ247−309 ’ , ’2ˆ256−1053 ’ ] ;
#
l en pr imes=len ( primes ) ;
#
f o r ind in range ( l en pr imes ) :
#modulo
Mod=primes [ ind ] ;
str mod= s t r p r ime s [ ind ] ;
p r i n t (”Modulo ”+str mod ) ;
# f=ax+b−−> b i t 0
a = 2 ; b = 1 ;
text1=”f = ”+s t r ( a)+”x+”+s t r (b)+”mod ”+str mod+”−−> b i t 0” ;
o . wr i t e ( text1 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
a = a%Mod; b = b%Mod;
# g=cx+d−−> b i t 1
c = 3 ; d = 1 ;
text2=”g =”+s t r ( c)+”x +”+s t r (d)+”mod ”+str mod+”−−> b i t 1” ;
o . wr i t e ( text2 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
c = c%Mod; d = d%Mod;
text3= ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”;
o . wr i t e ( text3 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#
#number o f random b i t s t r i n g s generated .
n=100;
#l eng th s o f the b i t s t r i n g s
L=[100 , 200 , 400 , 800 , 1000 , 2 0 0 0 ] ;
#
f o r i in range ( l en (L ) ) :
l=L [ i ] ; #length o f the s t r i n g s
p r i n t ( l ) ; textL=” l e n g t h ” ;
t ext4=text0+str mod ;
text4=text4+textL+s t r ( l )+”. txt ”
o1 = open ( text4 , ’w ’ ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( text4 ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( text1 ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( text2 ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( text3 ) ;
Appendix B. Python algorithm for the runtime of evaluating compositions of modular
linear functions 82
o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
t ext5= ”Length o f the compos it ion i s ”+s t r ( l ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( text5 ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
o . wr i t e ( text5 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#
meanTime=0;
f o r j in range (n ) :
B=randBinList ( l ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( s t r (B) ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
t ime =0;
X0=0; X1=1;
#time per forming the compos it ion
t0 = time . time ( ) ;
f o r k in range ( l ) :
i f B[ k]==0:
X0=(a∗X0+b)%Mod;
X1=(a∗X1+b)%Mod;
e l s e :
X0=(c∗X0+d)%Mod;
X1=(c∗X1+d)%Mod;
t1 = time . time ( )
t ime =t1−t0 ;
#o1 . wr i t e ( s t r (X0 ) ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#o1 . wr i t e ( s t r (X1 ) ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#o1 . wr i t e ( ’ { : . 2 0 f } ’ . format ( t ime ) ) ;
o1 . wr i t e (” s ” ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( s t r ( t ime ) ) ;
o1 . wr i t e (” s ” ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ )
##o1 . wr i t e ( s t r ( t0 ) ) ; o1 . wr i t e (” s ” ) ;
##o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
##o1 . wr i t e ( s t r ( t1 ) ) ; o1 . wr i t e (” s ” ) ;
##o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
meanTime=meanTime+time ;
# Average time f o r n random s t r i n g s o f l ength l
meanTime=meanTime/n ;
text7=”Average time f o r compos i t ions = ”
o1 . wr i t e ( text7 ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( s t r (meanTime ) ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
o1 . c l o s e ( ) ;
o . wr i t e ( text7 ) ; o . wr i t e ( s t r (meanTime ) ) ;
o . wr i t e (” sec ” ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
t ext8=”−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−”;
o . wr i t e ( text8 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
o . wr i t e ( text8 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
p r i n t (”THE END! ! ! ” )
o . c l o s e ( ) ;
Appendix C
SAGE Algorithm for generating
sequences modular linear hash values
#######################################
### Pr int ing hash va lue s f o r NIST ###
#######################################
# This f unc t i on s p r i n t a sequence o f modular l i n e a r hash va lues
# Sage
### Se t t i n g s
#Modulo
Mod = 2∗∗1257787−1;
str mod=” 2 ˆ1257787−1”;
# Format the number o f b i t s in the modulo f o r the p r i n t i n g f i l e
s t r i n g = ’{0:01257787b} ’
# Indexat ion used to c r e a t e the output f i l e s names
Range X = range ( 1 , 2 ) ;
#
n=100#number o f random b i t s t r i n g s to be generated
l =1500000; #l eng th s o f the b i t s t r i n g s
#
# f=ax+b−−> b i t 0
a = 2 ; b = 1 ;
# g=cx+d−−> b i t 1
c = 3 ; d = 1 ;
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### Preamble
import numpy as np
from random import ∗
# Function that gene ra t e s a random b i t s t r i n g o f l ength m
def randBinList (m) :
B=[ rand int (0 , 1 ) f o r t in range (1 ,m+1) ] ;
r e turn B
### Main func t i on
f o r IndeX in Range X :
### txt f i l e s
o1=open ( s t r ( IndeX)+” Const”+str mod+” inputLeng ”
+s t r ( l )+”. txt ” , ’w ’ ) ;
o2=open ( s t r ( IndeX)+” Const”+str mod+” inputLeng ”
+s t r ( l )+”. txt ” , ’w ’ ) ;
o1 . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ; o2 . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
f = [ a , b ] ; #f=a∗x+b as a vec to r
g = [ c , d ] ; #g=c∗x+d as a vec to r
f o r i in range (n ) :
B=randBinList ( l ) ;
comp= [1 , 0 ] ; #i d e n t i t y func t i on comp=1∗x+0
f o r k in range ( l ) :
i f B[ k]==0:
comp=[(comp [ 0 ] ∗ f [ 0 ] )%Mod,
( ( comp [ 0 ] ∗ f [ 1 ] )%Mod+comp[1 ] )%Mod ] ;
e l s e :
comp=[(comp [ 0 ] ∗ g [0 ] )%Mod,
( ( comp [ 0 ] ∗ g [1 ] )%Mod+comp[1 ] )%Mod ] ;
o1 . wr i t e ( s t r i n g . format (comp [ 0 ] ) ) ; o1 . wr i t e ( ’\ t ’ ) ;
o2 . wr i t e ( s t r i n g . format (comp [ 1 ] ) ) ; o2 . wr i t e ( ’\ t ’ ) ;
p r i n t ( i ) ; p r i n t (” ” ) ;
o1 . c l o s e ( ) ;
o2 . c l o s e ( ) ;
p r i n t (”THE END! ! ! ” )
Appendix D
Python code for the Chi-square test
###########################################
### Chi−Square Test ing ################
###########################################
# Python
### Se t t i n g s
#Modulo
Mod = 2∗∗20−153;
str mod=” 2 ˆ20−153”;
# Indexat ion used to c r e a t e the output f i l e s names
Range X = range ( 1 , 1 0 1 ) ;
#number o f hash va lue s generated (number o f samples observed )
n=8000000
#leng th s o f the b i t s t r i n g s input f o r the compos i t ion func t i on
l =100;
# C r i t i c a l va lue s at 99 .
x0=[1051793 .5894 ] #Mod number o f b ins => dof=Mod−1
#main txt f i l e
o = open (” Cons t t e rm un i f o rm i ty t e s t i ng”+str mod+”. txt ” , ’w ’ ) ;
t ex t=”Cons t t e rm un i f o rm i ty t e s t i ng”+str mod+”. txt ”
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ )
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# f=ax+b−−> b i t 0
a = 2 ; b = 1 ;
# g=cx+d−−> b i t 1
c = 3 ; d = 1 ;
### Preamble
import numpy as np
import math
from random import ∗
# Function that gene ra t e s a random b i t s t r i n g o f l ength m
def randBinList (m) :
B=[ rand int (0 , 1 ) f o r t in range (1 ,m+1) ] ;
r e turn B
# Expected f requency
Exp freq = f l o a t (n/Mod) ;
# s i g n i f i c a n c e l e v e l s
a lpha = [ . 0 1 ]
# func t i on that c r e a t e s an array with the bin edges
#def Bins (k ,w) :
#b=[0 ]∗ ( k+1);
#f o r i in range (1 , k+1):
#b [ i ]=b [ i−1]+w;
#return b
text=”H 0 : The d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f constant terms o f
the hash func t i on i s uniform ” ;
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ )
t ex t=”X 0ˆ2 = ”+s t r ( x0 ) ;
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ )
t ex t= ”Length o f input b i t s t r i n g s = ”+s t r ( l ) ;
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ )
t ex t= ”Number o f hash va lue s t e s t ed = ”+s t r (n ) ;
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ )
t ex t= ” Ind i v i dua l va lue s used as b ins ” ;
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ )
text1= ” f = ”+s t r ( a)+” x + ”+s t r (b)+” mod ”+str mod+” −−> b i t 0” ;
o . wr i t e ( text1 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
t ext2= ”g = ”+s t r ( c)+” x + ”+s t r (d)+” mod ”+str mod+” −−> b i t 1” ;
o . wr i t e ( text2 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
t ext3= ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”;
o . wr i t e ( text3 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
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nRe j e c t i on s 1=0
### Main func t i on
f o r IndeX in Range X :
# I n i t i a l va lue o f ch i square s t a t i s t i c
ch i s qua r e = 0 . 0∗1 . 0
f = [ a , b ] ; #f=a∗x+b as a vec to r
g = [ c , d ] ; #g=c∗x+d as a vec to r
#text1= ” f = ”+s t r ( a)+” x + ”+s t r (b)+” mod ”+str mod+” −−> b i t 0” ;
#o . wr i t e ( text1 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#text2= ”g = ”+s t r ( c)+” x + ”+s t r (d)+” mod ”+str mod+” −−> b i t 1” ;
#o . wr i t e ( text2 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n ’ ) ;
#text3= ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗”;
#o . wr i t e ( text3 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
#Vector that s t o r e s the hash va lue s
t ex t= ”∗ Test ”+s t r ( IndeX ) ; p r i n t ( t ex t )
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ )
f r e q=np . z e r o s (Mod) ;
#vecto r = [ ] ;
f o r i in range (n ) :
B=randBinList ( l ) ;
comp= [1 , 0 ] ; #i d e n t i t y func t i on comp=1∗x+0
f o r j in range ( l ) :
i f B[ j ]==0:
comp=[(comp [ 0 ] ∗ f [ 0 ] )%Mod,
( ( comp [ 0 ] ∗ f [ 1 ] )%Mod+comp[1 ] )%Mod ] ;
e l s e :
comp=[(comp [ 0 ] ∗ g [0 ] )%Mod,
( ( comp [ 0 ] ∗ g [1 ] )%Mod+comp[1 ] )%Mod ] ;
f r e q [ i n t (comp [ 1 ] ) ]= f r e q [ i n t (comp [ 1 ] ) ] + 1 ;
f o r i in range (Mod) :
f=f r e q [ i ] − Exp freq
ch i s qua r e += f ∗ f
c h i s qua r e /= Exp freq ; p r i n t ( ch i s qua r e )
t ex t=”Chi square i s ”+s t r ( ch i s qua r e )
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
f o r t in range ( l en ( x0 ) ) :
a l pha t = ’{0 : .2 f } ’ . format ( f l o a t ( a lpha [ t ] ) )
i f c h i s qua r e >= x0 [ t ] :
t ex t=”REJECT CLAIM” ;
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#pr in t ( t ex t )
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
nRe j e c t i on s 1 +=1
e l s e :
t ex t=”FAILED TO REJECT CLAIM” ;
#pr in t ( t ex t )
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
p r i n t (”number o f r e j e c t i o n s = ”+ s t r ( nRe j e c t i on s 1 ) )
o . wr i t e ( text3 ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
t ex t=”Number o f r e j e c t i o n s o f c la im at l e v e l 0.01=”+ s t r ( nRe j e c t i on s 1 )
o . wr i t e ( t ex t ) ; o . wr i t e ( ’\n \n ’ ) ;
o . c l o s e ( ) ;
p r i n t (”Number o f r e j e c t i o n s o f c la im ”)
p r in t ( nRe j e c t i on s 1 )
p r i n t (”THE END! ! ! \n”)
Appendix E
SAGE code for the FitFlorea-Matula
DLG Digit-serial Algorithm
###################################################
############### DLG #############################
###################################################
# Find an exponent i such that x = +/− hˆ i mod 2ˆk
###################################################
###################################################
### Preamble
import numpy as np
# Number o f b i t s o f modulo
k=5
# Log Base − s emipr im i t i v e root mod 2ˆk
logbase=11
# Number x to f i nd the dlg ( x )
x=3
###
# conver s i on o f x to a binary array with exac t l y k b i t s
A=np . z e ro s ( k )
ta=x . b i t s ( ) ;
# i f number o f b i t s o f x i s > k then drop the
k−l en ( ta ) b i t s because any
t−th b i t with t>=k+1 i s i r r e l e v a n t mod 2ˆk
i f ( l en ( ta)>k ) :
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f o r v in range (k ) :
A[ v]= in t ( ta [ v ] ) ;
e l s e :
f o r v in range ( l en ( ta ) ) :
A[ v]= in t ( ta [ v ] ) ;
# I n i t i a l i z a t i o n o f the mu l t i p l i c a t i v e i nv e r s e o f A
B=np . z e r o s l i k e (A)
B[ 0 ]=1 ;
# I n i t i a l i z a t i o n o f the exponent ( d lg )
b=np . z e r o s (k−2)
# conver s i on o f the log base to a binary array
with exac t l y k b i t s
tn=logbase . b i t s ( ) ;
N=np . z e ro s ( k )
# i f number o f b i t s o f l ogbase i s > k then drop the
k−l en ( ta ) b i t s because any t−th b i t with t>=k+1
i s i r r e l e v a n t mod 2ˆk
i f ( l en ( tn)>k ) :
f o r u in range (k ) :
N[ u]=tn [ u ]
e l s e :
f o r u in range ( l en ( tn ) ) :
N[ u]=tn [ u ]
### Function to r o l l and pad with z e ro s an array
de f r o l l z e r o p ad (a , s h i f t ) :
”””
Rol l e lements in a 1−row−array .
Elements o f f the end o f the array are t r ea t ed as z e ro s .
Parameters
−−−−−−−−−−
a : a r r a y l i k e
Input array with one row .
s h i f t : i n t
The number o f p l a c e s by which e lements are s h i f t e d .
Returns
−−−−−−−
r e s : ndarray
Output array , with the same shape as ‘ a ‘ .
”””
a = np . asanyarray ( a ) ; n = len ( a )
i f s h i f t == 0 :
re turn a
i f np . abs ( s h i f t ) > n :
r e s = np . z e r o s l i k e ( a )
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e l i f s h i f t < 0 :
s h i f t += n
ze ro s = np . z e r o s l i k e ( a . take (np . arange (n−s h i f t ) ) )
r e s = np . hstack ( ( a . take (np . arange (n−s h i f t , n ) ) , z e r o s ) )
e l s e :
z e r o s = np . z e r o s l i k e ( a . take (np . arange (n−s h i f t , n ) ) )
r e s = np . hstack ( ( zeros , a . take (np . arange (n−s h i f t ) ) ) )
re turn r e s
### Function to add two binary ar rays mod 2ˆk
de f add ( array1 , array2 ) :
”””
Add two binary ar rays o f same length mod 2ˆk where ‘k ‘
r e p r e s en t s the number o f b i t s in each array .
The r e s u l t i s a binary array o f same length as the
o r i g i n a l ones .
Parameters
−−−−−−−−−−
array1 : a r r a y l i k e
Input array .
array2 : a r r a y l i k e
Input array .
Returns
−−−−−−−
sum : ndarray
Output array , with the same number o f b i t s as ‘ array1 ‘
and ‘ array2 ‘ .
”””
l=len ( array1 ) ;
sum = [ ] ;
car ry=0;
f o r i in range ( l ) :
b i t 1=array1 [ i ] ;
b i t 2=array2 [ i ] ;
s=carry+in t ( b i t 1 )+ in t ( b i t 2 ) ;
i f s<=1:
car ry=0;
e l s e :
car ry=1;
i f s%2==0:
sum . append ( 0 ) ;
e l s e :
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sum . append ( 1 ) ;
r e turn sum
### Function to mult ip ly two binary ar rays o f same length mod 2ˆk
de f prod ( array1 , array2 ) :
”””
Mult ip ly two binary ar rays o f same length reduc ing
mod 2ˆk where ‘k ‘ r e p r e s en t s the number o f
b i t s in each array .
The r e s u l t i s a binary array o f same length as the
o r i g i n a l ones .
Parameters
−−−−−−−−−−
array1 : a r r a y l i k e
Input array .
array2 : a r r a y l i k e
Input array .
Returns
−−−−−−−
prod : ndarray
Output array , with the same number o f b i t s as ‘ array1 ‘
and ‘ array2 ‘ .
”””
l=len ( array1 ) ;
prod =np . z e r o s l i k e ( array1 ) ;
f o r i in range ( l ) :
i f array2 [ i ]==1:
temp =ro l l z e r o p ad ( array1 , i ) ;
prod =add ( prod , temp ) ;
r e turn prod
### Function to determine the two ’ s complement
o f a binary array mod 2ˆk
de f TwosCompl( array1 ) :
”””
Compute the two ’ s complement o f a binary array
mod 2ˆk where ‘k ‘ r e p r e s en t s the number o f
b i t s in the array .
The r e s u l t i s a binary array o f same length as the
o r i g i n a l one .
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Parameter
−−−−−−−−−−
array1 : a r r a y l i k e
Input array .
Returns
−−−−−−−
compl 1 : ndarray
Output array , with the same number o f b i t s as ‘ array1 ‘ .
”””
l=len ( array1 ) ;
compl 1=np . z e r o s l i k e ( array1 ) ;
compl 2=np . z e r o s l i k e ( array1 ) ;
compl 2 [ 0 ]=1 ;
f o r i in range ( l ) :
i f array1 [ i ]==0:
compl 1 [ i ]=1;
e l s e :
compl 1 [ i ]=0;
compl 1=add ( compl 1 , compl 2 ) ;
r e turn compl 1
### Main func t i on
i f ( (A[1]==1 and N[1]==0) or (A[2]==1 and N[1 ]==1)) :
P=TwosCompl(A)
s=1;
e l s e :
P=A;
s=0;
i f (P[ :3]==N [ : 3 ] ) . a l l ( ) :
B=N
b[0]=1
P=prod (P,B) ;
f o r j in range (3 , k ) :
N=prod (N,N) ;
i f P [ j ]==1:
M=np . z e r o s l i k e (b)
M[ j−2]=1
b=add (b ,M) ;
B=prod (B,N) ;
P=prod (P,N) ;
r e s u l t 1=TwosCompl(b)
r e s u l t 2 =0;
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f o r j in range (k−2):
r e s u l t 2=r e s u l t 2+( r e s u l t 1 [ j ]∗2ˆ j )
p r i n t ” decimal d lg e=”; p r i n t r e s u l t 2
p r i n t ” s i gn i s s=”; p r i n t s
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